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I. WARSAW CONVENTION 
A. Victoria Sales Corp. v. Emery Air Freight Inc., 917 F.2d 705 
(2d Cir. 1990); Recovery of money damages afforded under article 
18 of the Warsaw Convention does not extend to loss of cargo outside 
the physical boundaries of an airport. 
In Victoria Sales Corp. v. Emery Air Freight,• the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit considered the scope of pro-
tection afforded air cargo under article 18 of the Convention for the 
Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation 
by Air2 (Warsaw Convention) and whether it extended to cargo held 
outside the physical perimeters of an airport. Under article 18(1), lia-
bility under the Warsaw Convention extends to casualty to cargo or 
baggage sustained "during transportation by air."3 Article 18(2) de-
fines transportation by air as "the period during which the baggage or 
goods are in charge of the carrier, whether in an airport or on board 
an aircraft."4 Under article 18(3), however, "[t]he period of the trans-
portation by air shall not extend to any transportation by land . . . 
performed outside an airport. "s Because the damage to the goods at 
issue occurred at a warehouse outside the boundaries of Kennedy Air-
port, the court concluded that the loss was excluded from coverage 
under the Warsaw Convention. 6 Although article 18 may be inter-
preted as including damage incurred outside the physical perimeter of 
an airport while under a contract for air carriage, the court concluded 
that the plain language of the Warsaw Convention limits liability to 
the actual airport property.7 Thus, although the cargo at issue re-
mained in the custody of the air carrier at its warehouse less than a 
quarter mile off the airport property, article 18 liability did not apply. 
1. 917 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1990). 
2. Id. at 706 (citing Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to lnt'l 
Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876)[hereinafter Warsaw 
Convention]. 
3. Id. at 706 - 07 (citing Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 18(1)). 
4. Id. at 707 (citing Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 18(2)). 
5. Victoria Sales Corp., 917 F.2d at 707 (citing Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 
18(3)). 
6. Id. 
7. Id. 
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B. In re Air Disaster At Lockerbie, Scotland (Rein v. Pan 
American World Airways, Inc.), 928 F.2d 1267 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 112 S. Ct. 331 (1991); Punitive damages are not recoverable 
under article 17 of the Warsaw Convention even in the case of 
willful misconduct by an airline. 
In In re Air Disaster At Lockerbie, Scotland,8 the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals held that article 17 of the Warsaw Convention does 
not authorize punitive damages. This case consolidated two wrongful 
death actions brought by the relatives of passengers killed by terrorist 
attacks on commercial airlines. 9 The first case arose from the bomb-
ing of a Pan American World Airways, Inc. (Pan Am) aircraft over 
Lockerbie Scotland on December 21, 1988, in which all on board 
were killed; 10 the second case arose from the hijacking of a Pan Am 
aircraft on September 5, 1986 in Karachi, Pakistan. 11 In both actions, 
the plaintiffs sought punitive damages under article 17 of the Warsaw 
Convention and the Agreement Relating to Liability Limitations of 
the Warsaw Convention and Hague Protocol 12 (Montreal Accord). 
The court concluded that although the Warsaw Convention and the 
Montreal Accord are silent as to punitive damages, such damages are 
inconsistent with the purposes of either agreement. 13 
The overriding purpose of the Warsaw Convention, according to 
the court, was to limit air carriers' potential liability in the event of 
accidents. 14 The limitation was created to provide a more definite ba-
sis on which to calculate insurance premiums and to reduce the 
amount of disaster related litigation. 1s The court noted that, in effect, 
the liability limitation is a trade-off between the carriers and the pas-
sengers. 16 On the one hand, a carrier is per se liable for injuries or 
death incurred due to an accident on board an aircraft 17 unless the 
8. 928 F.2d 1267 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 331 (1991). 
9. Id. at 1269. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. 
12. Jn re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, 928 F.2d at 1269 (citing Warsaw Convention, supra 
note 2, art. 17; Agreement Relating to Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention and 
Hague Protocol, Agreement C.A.B. 18900, Approved by Exec. Order No. E-23680, May 13, 
1966, reprinted in CIVIL AERONAUTICS BoARD, AERONAUTICAL STATUTES AND RELATED 
MATERIAL 515 (1974)). 
13. Id. at 1270. 
14. Id. (citing Block v. Compagnie Nat'l Air France, 386 F.2d 1323, 1327 (5th Cir. 1967), 
cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968); Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Allan I. Mendelsohn, The United 
States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARV. L. REV. 497, 498 - 99 (1967)). 
15. Id. 
16. In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, 928 F.2d at 1271. 
17. Id. (citing Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 17). 
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carrier proves it had taken all steps necessary to avoid injury.18 In 
return, under article 22(1) of the Warsaw Convention and the Mon-
treal Accord, recovery is limited to $75,000. 19 Despite the article 22 
liability limitation, injured passengers may recover more if they show 
that the carrier engaged in willful misconduct or gross negligence. 20 
The court based its restriction of article 17 damages to compen-
satory damages, in part, on the legal significance of the phrase "dom-
mage survenu."21 Plaintiffs argued that "dommage survenu" 
translates broadly as "damage occurred" or "damage happened. "22 
The court disagreed, finding that "dommage survenu" has been prop-
erly translated as "damage sustained."23 This translation had been 
relied upon by the U.S. State Department and at subsequent conven-
tions held to revise the Warsaw Convention, where English and 
French were official languages. 24 The court supported this interpreta-
tion with the later language of article 17 ("subie par un voyageur lor-
sque !'accident qui a caus [sic] le dommage") translated literally as 
"suffered by a traveler if the accident ... caused the damage," because 
an accident could not "cause" purely legal punitive damages. 25 Simi-
larly, previous U.S. cases have construed "dommage survenu" as per-
taining to compensatory damages. 26 Because article 17 confers 
liability for damage actually sustained, only compensatory damages 
18. Id. (citing Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 20(1)). 
19. Id. at 1280. 
20. In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, 928 F.2d at 1285 (quoting Warsaw Convention, 
supra note 2, art. 25). Article 25 of the Warsaw Convention provides: 
Id. 
The carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the provisions of this convention 
which exclude or limit his liability, if the damage is caused by his willful misconduct or 
by such default on his part as, in accordance with the law of the court to which the case 
is submitted, is considered to be the equivalent to willful misconduct. 
21. Id. at 1280 - 81. 
The French text of article 17 provides: 
Le transporteur est responsable du dommage survenu en cas de mort, de blessure ou de 
toute autre lesion corporelle subie par un voyageur lorsque }'accident qui a cause le 
dommage s'est produit a bord de l'aeronef OU au COUfS de toutes operations 
d'embarquement et de debarquement. 
Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention provides: 
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the death or wounding 
of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by the passenger, if the accident 
which caused the damage so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course 
of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking. 
Id. at 1280. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. at 1281. 
24. In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, 928 F.2d at 1281. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. at 1281 (citing Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 872 F.2d 1462 (11th Cir. 1989), 
8
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for actual harm caused by the accident, rather than general legal or 
punitive damages, were allowed under article 17. 27 
The court also acknowledged that punitive damages are contrary 
to the goals pursued by the liability scheme of the Warsaw Conven-
tion. 28 First, allowing punitive damages contravenes the goal of en-
couraging uniformity in the scope of liability and damages. 29 The 
availability of punitive damage awards under the Warsaw Convention 
based on national laws would defeat uniformity because national laws 
differ widely in their allowance of punitive damages. 30 Second, the 
availability of punitive damages could make airlines uninsurable.31 
Many jurisdictions proscribe insuring against punitive damages in 
fear that it would lessen the deterrent effect of punitive damages on 
willful misconduct. 32 Third, with the unpredictability of punitive 
awards, an uninsured airline faces exorbitant losses with each acci-
dent. 33 Even if the airline had insurance against punitive damages, 
ticket prices would escalate to compensate for premiums undoubtably 
difficult to calculate.34 Finally, the allowance of punitive damages 
would create a stronger incentive for every plaintiff claiming willful 
misconduct to litigate. 3s 
The court also disposed of plaintiffs' claim that punitive damages 
may be recovered under article 24(2) regardless of the translation of 
article 17. 36 Although plaintiffs contended that article 24(2) leaves 
the issue of recoverable damages to national laws, the drafting history 
and accompanying reports to the Warsaw Convention indicate that 
the primary concerns of article 24(2) were the rules of descent and 
cert granted, 110 S. Ct. 2585 (1990); In re Air Disaster at Gander, Newfoundland, 684 F. 
Supp. 927 (W.D.Ky. 1987)). 
27. Id. 
28. In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, 928 F.2d at 1287. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. 
32. In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, 928 F.2d at 1287. 
33. Id. at 1288. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, 928 F.2d at 1282 - 84. Article 24 of the Warsaw 
Convention provides: 
(1) In the cases covered by articles 18 and 19 [baggage claims] any action for damages, 
however founded, can only be brought subject to the conditions and limits set out in 
this convention. 
(2) In the cases covered by article 17 the provisions of the preceding paragraph shall 
also apply, without prejudice to the questions as to who are the persons who have the 
right to bring suit and what are their respective rights. 
Id. at 1282 (quoting Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 24). 
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distribution. 37 Because the national laws of descent regarding wrong-
ful death actions vary widely, the drafters left the issue of wrongful 
death actions and recoverable damages to national law.38 The fact 
that article 24(2) is silent as to punitive damages is further evidence 
that it is not a vehicle for their recovery under the Warsaw Conven-
tion. 39 Punitive damages are unique to common law systems and 
would have been controversial in multinational agreements. 40 If the 
issue had been raised, the drafters would have hotly debated it.41 
The court also rejected plaintiffs' claim that punitive damages are 
recoverable under article 25 of the Warsaw Convention. 42 Plaintiffs 
argued that even if article 17 does not allow punitive damages, it does 
not apply when the carrier has engaged in willful misconduct. 43 The 
court concluded, however, that on its face, article 17 is not a provision 
affecting liability within the scope of article 25.44 No authorities had 
interpreted it so. 45 The phrase "exclude or limit" liability has been 
extended to article 20(1) (due diligence and impossibility defenses),46 
article 22(1) (monetary limits)47 and has been argued to extend to arti-
cles 21 (contributory negligence) and 26(4) (statute of limitations for 
baggage and cargo). 48 The court found, finally, that upon demonstra-
tion of willful misconduct, article 25 bars the application of certain 
provisions of the Warsaw Convention. 49 Because punitive damages 
are inconsistent with the goals of the remaining operative provisions 
of the Warsaw Convention, by implication they were not contem-
plated by the Warsaw Convention, even in the case of willful 
misconduct. so 
37. Id. at 1283. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. at 1284. 
40. In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, 928 F.2d at 1284. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. at 1285. 
43. Id. 
44. In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, 928 F.2d at 1285 - 86. 
45. Id. at 1286. 
46. Id. (citing Molitch v. Irish lnt'l Airlines, 436 F.2d 42, 44, n.1 (2d Cir. 1970)). 
47. Id. (citing Grey v. American Airlines, 227 F.2d 282, 285 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 
350 U.S. 989 (1956)). 
48. In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, 928 F.2d at 1286 (citing 7 SHA WCROSS & BEAU-
MONT, AIR LAW 213 (4th ed. 1990)). 
49. Id. at 1285 - 86. 
50. Id. at 1285 (citing Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 17). 
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C. Sulewski v. Federal Express Corp., 933 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 
1991 ); For the purposes of article 17 of the Warsaw Convention a 
''passenger" is a person who is: 1) transported pursuant to a contract 
for carriage and 2) traveling for the simple pleasure of traveling or 
simply to get from one location to another. 
Sulewski v. Federal Express Corp.,s• arose out of the crash of a 
Flying Tigerss2 cargo aircraft at the Kuala Lumpur airport in which 
plaintiff's husband was killed. The decedent had been employed by 
Flying Tigers as a mechanic assigned to travel on specified flights des-
tined for locations where the carrier did not have mechanics sta-
tioned. s3 The demised flight had been scheduled to fly from 
Singapore to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia and then to Hong Kong.s4 
Although Flying Tigers had ground mechanics in Singapore and 
Hong Kong, they did not have one in Kuala Lumpur.ss Although 
required to be present on their assigned flights, mechanics were re-
sponsible for transportation to and from the assigned flights. s6 
Mechanics could either arrange for commercial air transportation or 
ride on scheduled Flying Tigers flights as off-duty "deadheads. "s7 
Both the trial court and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
agreed that the decedent was not a "passenger" under article 17 of the 
Warsaw Convention.ss In defining "passenger," the court looked first 
to the scope of article 1 of the Warsaw Convention.s9 The Second 
51. 933 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1991). 
52. Defendant Federal Express Corp. is Flying Tigers Corp.'s successor in interest. Id. at 
182. 
53. Id. at 181. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. 
56. Sulewski, 933 F.2d at 181. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention provides that: 
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the death or wounding 
of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if the accident which 
caused the damage so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any 
of the operations of embarking or disembarking. 
Id. (quoting Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 17)(emphasis added). 
59. Id. Article 1 of the Warsaw Convention provides: 
(1) This convention shall apply to all international transportation of persons, baggage, 
or goods performed by aircraft for hire. It shall apply equally to gratuitous transporta-
tion by aircraft performed by an air transportation enterprise. 
(2) For the purposes of this convention the expression "international transportation" 
shall mean any transportation in which, according to the contract made by the parties, 
the place of departure and the place of destination, whether or not there be a break in 
the transportation or a transshipment, are situated either within the territories of two 
High Contracting Parties, or within the territory of a single High Contracting Party 
11
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Circuit noted that article 1 applies broadly "to all international trans-
portation of persons. "60 A passenger within the meaning of the War-
saw Convention does not require the person to be a fare paying 
traveler because article 1(1) specifically includes gratuitous transpor-
tation. 61 Thus, employees of an air carrier receiving free transporta-
tion not related to work could be "passengers" within the meaning of 
article 17. 62 
The court further noted that article 1 (2) contemplates that "pas-
sengers" be transported pursuant to a contract for carriage. 63 Con-
tracts for carriage need be no more than "a promise, an undertaking, 
on the part of the carrier to transport the passenger, and the consent 
of the passenger."64 Thus, the Warsaw Convention covers only those 
passengers transported pursuant to a contract. 65 The court also con-
sidered the common dictionary definition of "passenger": "one who 
travels either for the pleasure of traveling simpliciter or for the mun-
dane purposes of getting from one point to another."66 The court 
then distinguished the two requirements of "passengers" under article 
17. First, the person must travel pursuant to a contract for carriage. 67 
Second, they must travel either for the simple pleasure of traveling or 
simply for the purposes of getting from one location to another.68 
According to the court, plaintiff's husband, the decedent, did not 
satisfy the two part test because he was traveling on the flight pursu-
ant to his employment contract rather than pursuant to a contract for 
carriage. 69 Moreover, the decedent's purpose for flying was to fulfill 
his job requirements. 70 Decedent did not board the flight as someone 
merely traveling from one location to another.71 Thus, the court held 
that as long as the decedent's presence on the flight was specifically 
required, the lack of in-flight duties did not provide him with the sta-
Id. (quoting Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. l(l))(emphasis added). 
60. Sulewski, 933 F .2d at 183. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. at 183 - 84. 
64. Sulewski, 933 F.2d at 183 - 84 (citing Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386 
F.2d 323, 333 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968); GRONFORS, AIR CHARTER 
AND THE WARSAW CONVENTION 60 (1956)). 
65. Id. at 184. 
66. Id. (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1650 (1971)). 
67. Id. 
68. Sulewski, 933 F.2d at 184. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
12
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 18, No. 1 [1992], Art. 8
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol18/iss1/8
1992] 1990-91 Survey 153 
tus of a "passenger."72 Therefore, there was no article 17 liability for 
the airline under the Warsaw Convention. 
D. In re Air Crash Disaster Near Warsaw, Poland, 760 F. Supp. 
30 (E.D.N.Y. 1991); The "destination" of the passenger for the 
purposes of establishing subject matter jurisdiction under the Warsaw 
Convention can be other than that stated on the ticket, depending on 
the intended destination of the passenger. 
In In re Air Crash Disaster Near Warsaw, Poland, 73 the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York held that 
the "destination" of passengers for the purposes of establishing sub-
ject matter juri~diction under article 28 of the Warsaw Convention 
could be other than that stated on the passenger's ticket.74 The Dis-
trict Court, therefore, had subject matter jurisdiction over an action 
brought by representatives of airline passengers killed in a crash of an 
airplane owned by defendant LOT Polish Airlines (LOT). 75 
Although the deceased passengers intended only to fly from Poland to 
New York, they were required by the Polish government to purchase 
round-trip tickets. 76 At the outset of litigation, defendant LOT 
moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the 
Warsaw Convention. LOT argued that because the passengers' ulti-
mate destination according to their tickets was Poland, article 28 of 
the Warsaw Convention would not permit litigation in the U.S.77 The 
District Court disagreed. 
Under article 28 of the Warsaw Convention, claims under the 
Warsaw Convention may be brought in four locations: (1) the domi-
cile of the carrier; (2) the carrier's principal place of business; (3) the 
carrier's place of business through which the contract for carriage was 
made; and ( 4) the place of destination. 78 Although the Second Circuit 
had previously interpreted the "place of destination" under article 28 
to mean the destination stated on the ticket, 79 the District Court held 
72. Cf. Mexico City Aircrash, 708 F.2d 400 (9th Cir. 1983) ("Deadheading" stewardess 
aboard employer's aircraft in transport to origination point of ftight to which she was assigned 
and having neither in-flight duties on demised ftight nor contractual obligation to be aboard 
may have been a passenger under the Warsaw Convention)(cited in Sulewski, 933 F.2d at 186). 
73. 7(1.) F. Supp. 30 (E.D.N.Y. 1991). 
74. Id. at 32. 
75. Id. at 31. 
76. Id. at 32. 
77. In re Air Disaster Near Warsaw, Poland, 7(1.) F. Supp. at 30. 
78. Id. (citing Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 28). 
79. Id. at 31 (citing Petrire v. Spantax, S.A., 756 F.2d 263 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 
846 (1985)). 
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that the intended destination controlled even if different than that 
stated on the ticket. so 
The policy of article 28, according to the District Court, was to 
allow litigation in countries that have an interest in the litigation or 
have unique competency to hear a case because of location.81 The 
governmental interest in the place of destination stems from the pas-
senger having an enduring relationship with that country.82 That ele-
ment of governmental interest, according to the District Court, would 
be no less where the passenger intended one country to be the ulti-
mate destination and the ticket stated otherwise. 83 Under this inter-
pretation of article 28, the District Court, therefore, had subject 
matter jurisdiction based on the destination intended by the ticket 
holders.84 
E. Padilla v. Olympic Airways, 765 F. Supp. 835 (S.D.N.Y. 
1991 ); Plaintiff failed to show that injuries sustained due to 
voluntary intoxication in flight are within the scope of the term 
"accident" for purposes of airline liability under article 17 of the 
Warsaw Convention. 
In Padilla v. Olympic Airways, ss the United States District Court 
for the Southern District of New York considered the scope of the 
term "accident" under article 17 of the Warsaw Convention and 
whether it applied to a passenger's loss of consciousness as a result of 
intoxication. 86 Article 17 provides that if a passenger proves that the 
alleged injuries were proximately caused by an "accident," the carrier 
will be liable without proof of fault. 87 In this case, plaintiff became 
intoxicated while in flight from Greece to the U.S., lost consciousness 
in the lavatory of defendant's aircraft and injured his left arm. 88 
Plaintiff subsequently sought compensation for lost earnings and pain 
and suffering under the Warsaw Convention. 89 Plaintiff alleged that 
defendant caused the accident by allowing him to become intoxicated 
during the course of the flight. 90 
80. Id. 
81. In re Air Crash Disaster Near Warsaw, Poland, 7ffJ F. Supp. at 32. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
85. 765 F. Supp. 835 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
86. Id. at 837. 
87. Id. (citing Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 17). 
88. Id. at 836 - 37. 
89. Padilla, 765 F. Supp. at 837. 
90. Id. at 838. 
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The District Court entered judgment for the defendant holding 
that plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the injuries resulted from an 
"accident" within the meaning of article 17. 91 Although the Warsaw 
Convention does not define "accident," the U.S. Supreme Court has 
defined it to cover: 
an unexpected or unusual event or happening that is external to the 
passenger . . . . But when the injury indisputably results from the 
passenger's own internal reaction to the usual, normal, and expected 
operation of the aircraft, it has not been caused by an accident, and 
Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention cannot apply. 92 
The District Court concluded that plaintiff had failed to show the 
injuries were sustained as a result of an unusual or unexpected event 
and that the injuries likely resulted from his own internal reaction to 
voluntary intoxication. 93 
II. JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN DEFENDANTS 
A. Landoil Resources Corp. v. Alexander & Alexander Serv., 
Inc., 918 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1990); Thirteen business trips to New 
York in an eighteen month period were not enough to confer 
personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants under the New York 
''solicitation plus" rule. 
In Landoil Resources Corp. v. Alexander & Alexander Serv., 
Inc., 94 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals found that activity of de-
fendant insurance and reinsurance brokers in New York was not suffi-
cient to confer personal jurisdiction under the New York jurisdiction 
statutes. The applicability of New York Civil Practice Law & Rules 
§ 301 for finding presence in New York turns on whether the contact 
with the state can be considered systematic and continuous "doing 
business" in New York.95 
The Second Circuit had previously held that under New York 
law, solicitation of business alone will not justify a finding of corpo-
rate presence. 96 Applying a "solicitation plus" rule, jurisdiction may 
be found where the foreign defendant not only engages in substantial 
and continuous solicitation, but also engages in other activities of sub-
91. Id. 
92. Id. at 837 (citing Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 40S - 06 (198S)). 
93. Padilla, 76S F. Supp. at 838. 
94. 918 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1990). 
9S. Id. at 1043. 
96. Id. (citing Hoffritz For Cutlery, Inc. v. Amajac, Ltd., 763 F.2d SS, S1 (2d Cir. 198S)). 
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stance in New York.97 In this case, although the insurance and rein-
surance brokers had made thirteen trips to New York in an eighteen 
month period, the court did not construe these activities as satisfying 
the ·"solicitation plus" rule.98 
B. Alexander & Alexander Serv., Inc. v. Lloyd's Syndicate 317, 
925 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1991); Maintaining a trust fund in a New 
York bank for purposes of underwriting in New York was not 
sufficient activity for a foreign defendant to fall within the "doing 
business" provision of New York jurisdiction statutes. 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reached the identical con-
clusion in Alexander & Alexander Services, Inc. v. Lloyd's Syndicate 
317 99 as was reached in Landoil Resources Corp. v. Alexander & Alex-
ander Serv., Inc. 100 After certifying the question regarding the appli-
cability of the New York long arm statute to a foreign insurance 
underwriter, 101 the Second Circuit dismissed the action in federal 
court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.102 Maintaining a trust 
fund in a New York bank for the purposes of underwriting in New 
York was insufficient activity to fall within the § 301 "doing business" 
provision of New York Civil Practice Law and Rules. 103 
C. Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 937 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 
1991); The PLO is not a "state" under the F.S.LA., therefore it is 
not immune from suit under the F.S.LA. and, although politically 
charged, the suit did not involve non-justicable political questions. 
Additionally, choice of law analysis is required to determine whether 
Italian substantive law governs the dispute and thus whether U.S. 
federal or state service of process rules apply. 
In Klinghojfer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 104 the Second Circuit held 
97. Id. at 1043 - 44 (citing Beacon Enterprises, Inc. v. Menzies, 715 F.2d 757, 763 (2d 
Cir. 1983)). 
98. Landoil Resources, 918 F.2d at 1045 - 46. 
99. 925 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1991). 
100. 918 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1990) (discussed in text supra part II.A.). 
101. Alexander & Alexander Serv., Inc. 925 F.2d at 45 (citing N.Y. C1v. PRAC. L. & R. 
§ 301). 
102. Id. at 47. 
103. Id. at 46. 
104. 937 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1991). The Second Circuit had previously granted the PLO's 
petition for leave to appeal after the district court had denied the PLO's motion to dismiss. 
See Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 921 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1990). The Second Circuit held 
that because an interlocutory order denying defendant's immunity claims involved a control-
ling question of law and one on which there may be substantial grounds for difference of 
opinion, it was worthy of immediate appellate review. 
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that the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) is not a "foreign 
state" within the meaning of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
(F.S.I.A.). The combined civil actions against the PLO stemmed 
from the hijacking of the Achille Lauro ship in the Mediterranean 
and the homicide of Leon Klinghoffer in October 1985. 10s Marilyn 
Klinghoffer and the estate of Leon Klinghoffer commenced the action 
in the District Court106 against the owner and charterer of the Achille 
Lauro, two travel agencies, and additional defendants. 107 Other pas-
sengers subsequently initiated the companion actions. 108 
Defendants impleaded the PLO for indemnification and contri-
bution, as well as for compensatory and punitive damages for tortious 
interference with business. 109 Service of process was attempted on the 
PLO through its Permanent Observer at the United Nations. 110 The 
PLO moved for dismissal on the grounds that it was immune under 
the F.S.l.A., 111 that the case presented a non-justiciable political con-
troversy, 112 that the court lacked personal jurisdiction113 and that the 
service of process was deficient. 114 The District Court denied the mo-
tion and denied a subsequent motion for reargument. 11s Nevertheless, 
the court certified the question for interlocutory appeat.116 
The Second Circuit first concluded that the PLO did not fall 
within the definition of "foreign state" under the F.S.l.A. 117 The 
court had previously held that states include "entit[ies] that ha[ve] a 
defined territory and a permanent population, [that are] under the 
control of [their] own government, and that engage[] in, or ha[ve] the 
Id. 
105. Id. at 46. 
106. Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 739 F. Supp. 854 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
107. Klinghoffer, 937 F.2d at 47. 
108. Id. at 47. 
109. Id. The court noted: 
[I]t remains unclear what role, if any, the PLO played in the events described above. 
According to some reports, the seizure was undertaken at the behest of Abdul Abbas, 
who is reportedly a member of the PLO. The PLO, however, denies any responsibility 
for the hijacking, and maintains that its involvement in the affair was limited to helping 
to secure the surrender of the hijackers and to ensure the safety of the ship and its 
passengers. 
110. Id. 
111. Klinghoffer, 937 F.2d at 47 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602 - 1611 (1988)). 
112. Id. at 49. 
113. Id. at 50. 
114. Id. at 52. 
115. Klinghoffer, 937 F.2d at 47. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. 
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capacity to engage in, formal relations with other such entities." 118 
According to the court, the PLO possessed none of these characteris-
tics.119 Although the PLO Declaration of Statehood "contemplates" 
that the territory will consist of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and 
East Jerusalem, the mere hope of controlling that territory "does not 
establish that it has a defined territory now." 120 More importantly, 
the exiled PLO Government in no sense controlled its contemplated 
territory. 121 Finally, the PLO lacked capacity to implement the obli-
gations that are necessary to any capacity to enter into formal interna-
tional relations because it did not control any territory. 122 Thus, the 
fact that the PLO had Permanent Observer status at the U.N. did not 
avail it of the immunity afforded under the F.S.l.A.123 
The court next concluded that the PLO's claim that the case 
presented a non-justiciable political question was without merit. 124 
Although the court felt the issues surrounding the existence of an in-
dependent Palestinian state injected politics into the case, the fact that 
the case was politically charged did not, in and of itself, establish non-
justiciable political questions.12s 
Political questions have been found under six conditions: ( 1) 
where there is constitutional assignment of the issue to one of the 
coordinate branches of government; (2) where there is a lack of stan-
dards for resolution of the issue; (3) where the issue is unresolvable 
without a policy determination outside judicial discretion; (4) where 
resolution requires judicial encroachment on one of the coordinate 
branches; (5) where there is need for adherence to a political decision 
already made; or ( 6) where multifarious pronouncements from the 
various branches on a single issue is likely.126 The court concluded 
that the Klinghoffer action was, in substance, an ordinary tort claim 
and none of the circumstances typical of a political question were 
present. 127 
On the issues of personal jurisdiction and service of process, the 
118. Id. (citing National Petrochemical Co. v. MIT Stolt Sheaf, 860 F.2d 551, 553 (2d 
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1081 (1989) (quoting RESTATMENT {THIRD) FOREIGN RE-
LATIONS LAW § 201 (1987)). 
119. Klinghoffer, 937 F.2d at 48. 
120. Id. at 47. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. at 48. 
123. Klinghoffer, 937 F.2d at 48. 
124. Id. at 49. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)). 
127. Klinghoffer, 937 F.2d at 49. 
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Second Circuit found that the evidence on the record was not suffi-
cient to make a ruling. 128 Regarding personal jurisdiction, the court 
noted that because the action was under the court's admiralty juris-
diction, the law of the forum state (New York) govemed. 129 The only 
plausible source of personal jurisdiction under New York law is found 
in New York Civil Practice Law & Rules§ 301 which confers juris-
diction over entities "doing business" in New York. 130 Under§ 301, 
an entity is doing business in New York when it is engaged in activity 
in New York of a continuous and substantial character so as to be 
present in the state. 131 The court held, however, that only PLO activ-
ities not conducted in furtherance of its status as Permanent Observer 
at the U.N. may be considered as a basis for jurisdiction.132 
In determining whether jurisdiction would exist, consideration of 
the PLO's U.N. activities would conflict with prior judicial construc-
tion of the Anti-Terrorism Act133 (A.T.A.) which bars transactions 
with or on behalf of the PL0.134 Although the A.T.A. bars PLO ac-
tivity in the U.S., the statute was held not to preclude maintenance of 
a mission to the U.N. 13s The PLO's participation in the U.N. is based 
on the legal fiction that the U.N. Headquarters is not on U.S. terri-
tory, but on neutral ground over which the U.S. has ceded control. 136 
Moreover, . conferring U.S. jurisdiction over individuals conducting 
business at the U.N. may put an undue burden on organizations par-
ticipating in U.N. a:ffairs.137 The court remanded the case for deter-
mination of whether the PLO's non-U.N. activities would provide a 
jurisdictional basis.138 
The PLO's complaint of defective service of process was based on 
process being served on the PLO's U.N. Observer in New York, nam-
ing the PLO only by its common name.139 Under New York law, 
initiatory process served on unincorporated associations must name 
128. Id. at 52. 
129. Id. at 50 (citing Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219, 223 (2d Cir. 1963) 
(en bane)). 
130. Id. {citing N.Y.C1v. PRAC. L. & R. § 301). 
131. Klinghoffer, 937 F.2d at 50. 
132. Id. at 51. 
133. Id. (citing Anti-Terrorism Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 5201 - 5203 (1988)). 
134. Id. (citing United States v. PLO, 695 F. Supp. 1456, 1471 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)). 
135. Klinghoffer, 937 F.2d at 51 (citing United States v. PLO, 695 F. Supp. 1456, 1471 
(S.D.N.Y. 1988)). 
136. Id. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. at 52. 
139. Klinghoffer, 937 F.2d. at 52. 
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and be served on the President or Treasurer of the association. 140 The 
service of process on the PLO in this case would therefore be defi-
cient. Alternatively, under federal law, naming the PLO in its com-
mon name and serving papers on its agent in New York would be 
adequate service of process. 141 Under Rule l 7(b) of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, the law of the forum state determines the appro-
priate manner in which process is to be served, unless the action arises 
under the U.S. Constitution or federal statutes.142 
In cases where foreign law applies, federal law is supplanted and 
the choice of law rules of the forum state control the proper method 
of service of process. 143 The District Court erroneously reasoned, 
however, that because the action was brought under maritime and 
admiralty jurisdiction, U.S. federal law applied. 144 The District Court 
instead should have engaged in a choice of law analysis as to whether 
federal or New York service of process rules applied. 145 Under the 
Supreme Court's holding in Lauritzen v. Larsen, 146 even if jurisdiction 
has been asserted under U.S. admiralty law, another nation's contacts 
with a particular event may be so great as to warrant application of 
the law of that nation. 147 The Second Circuit remanded the case, 
holding that the District Court should have engaged in a choice of 
law analysis to determine whether Italian law applied because the ship 
involved was of Italian ownership and the events giving rise to the 
action took place in the Mediterranean. 148 
D. Posadas De Mexico, S.A. v. Dukes, 757 F. Supp. 297 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991); A foreign corporation is not required to file a 
certificate of authority to transact business in New York where its 
intrastate activities are merely incidental to its interstate and 
international activities. 
In Posadas De Mexico, S.A. v. Dukes, 149 the Federal District 
Court for the Southern District of New York held that the New York 
140. Id. (citing N.Y. GEN. Ass'NS LAW§ 13 (McKinney 1991)). 
141. Id. at 53 (citing FED. R. C1v. P. 4(d)(3)). 
142. Id. 
143. Klinghoffer, 937 F.2d. at 54. 
144. Id. at 53. 
145. Id. 
146. 345 U.S. 571 (1953) (cited in Klinghoffer, 937 F.2d at 53). 
147. Klinghoffer, 937 F.2d at 53 (citing Bilyk v. Vessel Nair, 754 F.2d 1541 (9th Cir. 
1985)). 
148. Id. at 54. 
149. 757 F. Supp. 297 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
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statute1so requiring foreign corporations doing business in New York 
to file a certificate of authority to transact business in New York 
before bringing an action did not apply when plaintiff's intrastate ac-
tivities were merely incidental to its interstate and international activi-
ties.ts• Plaintiff Posadas owned and operated hotels located 
exclusively in Mexico.1s2 Plaintiff never maintained an office, employ-
ees or a telephone listing in New York, was not licensed to do busi-
ness in New York and did not conduct intrastate business.1s3 Plaintiff 
did, however, maintain a bank account in New York for the purposes 
of receiving deposits from travelers who made reservations at plain-
tiff's resorts,ts4 Defendants were New York independent contractors 
who handled reservations, deposits and marketing services for plain-
tiff.1ss Plaintiff contended that in the course of its relationship with 
defendants, defendants converted deposits remitted to secure reserva-
tions at plaintiff's hotels and plaintiff sought $221, 122.31 in compen-
satory and punitive damages. •s6 
At trial, defendants moved to amend their answer1s7 to assert an 
affirmative defense that plaintiff had not filed the required certificate 
of authority to transact business in New York1ss and moved for dis-
missal.1s9 The court denied the motion, ruling that although plaintiff 
maintained bank accounts and engaged in relations with independent 
contractors in New York, it was not engaging in substantial intrastate 
activity in New York sufficient to trigger New York Business Corpo-
ration Law (B.C.L.) § 1312 which regulates foreign corporations do-
ing business in New York. 160 Where, as in this case, the activity in 
New York was only incidental to interstate or international com-
merce, B.C.L. § 1312 did not apply.161 The fact that plaintiff's activi-
150. Id. at 299 n.1 (quoting N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW§ 1312 (McKinney 1990)). 
151. Id. at 301 - 02. 
152. Id. at 298. 
153. Posadas, 757 F. Supp. at 298. 
154. Id. 
155. Id. 
156. Id. 
157. Posadas, 757 F. Supp. at 300 (discussing FED. R. C1v. P. 15(a)). 
158. Id. at 299. Section 1312 provides in part: 
A foreign corporation doing business in this state without authority shall not maintain 
any action or special proceeding in this state unless and until such corporation has been 
authorized to do business in this state and it has paid to the state all fees, penalties and 
franchise taxes for the years or parts thereof during which it did business in this state 
without authority. 
Id. (quoting N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1312). 
159. Id. 
160. Id. at 300. 
161. Posadas, 757 F. Supp. at 301. 
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ties may have constituted "doing business" for the purposes of 
personal jurisdiction had no bearing on the applicability of B.C.L. 
§ 1312.162 Whether the plaintiff had engaged in commerce elsewhere 
in the U.S. was similarly irrelevant to assessing the applicability of 
B.C.L. § 1312.163 
E. Volkswagen De Mexico, S.A. v. Germanischer Lloyd, 768 F. 
Supp. 1023 (S.D.N.Y 1991); Plaintiff did not satisfy New York 
CP.L.R. § 301 or§ 302(a)(l) and thus failed to establish personal 
jurisdiction over foreign defendants who had only slight contacts with 
New York. 
In Volkswagen De Mexico, S.A. v. Germanischer Lloyd,164 the 
Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York held 
that it could not exercise personal jurisdiction over defendants who 
had only slight contact with New York. 165 This case arose out of the 
1987 disappearance of the M/V Tuxpan en route to Mexico and the 
U.S. from West Germany.166 Plaintiffs in the action were composed 
of 128 shippers, consignees, owners and insurers of cargo lost on the 
Tuxpan who brought an action for loss of cargo. 167 Defendant Sietas 
was the builder of the Tuxpan, defendant Krupp was the builder of 
the Tuxpan's engines and defendant Germanischer, a classification so-
ciety, certified the Tuxpan. 168 Although Germanischer maintained an 
office in New York and conceded jurisdiction, Krupp and Sietas had 
no offices in the U.S. and contested jurisdiction. 169 
Plaintiffs alleged that jurisdiction over Krupp could be exercised 
based on activities of Krupp subsidiaries in Illinois and Ontario. 170 
The Illinois subsidiary, however, had not effected a sale in New York 
since 1984.171 Although the Illinois subsidiary had an agreement with 
a company located in Texas to service Krupp products, Krupp con-
tended that the relationship was not an agency on which jurisdiction 
could be founded. 172 In addition, Krupp had contractual relations 
with a New York company, but no transactions with the company 
162. Id. at 301 - 02. 
163. Id. at 301 n.1. 
164. 768 F. Supp 1023 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
165. Id. at 1028. 
166. Id. at 1026. 
167. Id. 
168. Volkswagen, 768 F. Supp. at 1025. 
169. Id. at 1025 - 26. 
170. Id. at 1026. 
171. Id. 
172. Volkswagen, 768 F. Supp. at 1026. 
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had occurred since 1982. 173 In the alternative, plaintiffs contended 
that jurisdiction over Sietas may have been based on its employees' 
presence in Texas during 1984 and 1985 in connection with repair and 
maintenance of the Tuxpan and another ship. 174 
Plaintiffs contended that personal jurisdiction may be exercised 
over Krupp and Sietas because both were "doing business" in New 
York within C.P.L.R. § 301 175 and had transacted business in New 
York within C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(l)176 or that their contacts with New 
York warranted further discovery as to the extent of their contacts. 177 
The District Court, however, rejected both bases of jurisdiction. 11s 
No evidence was produced suggesting that Krupp's contact with New 
York companies or the activities of its Illinois or Ontario subsidiaries 
resulted in any recent activities in New York. 179 Furthermore, evi-
dence that was presented did not suggest that further discovery would 
reveal New York activities. 1so Krupp's only recent activities in New 
York were attributable to advertising in magazines distributed in New 
York. 1s1 The court held that solicitation of business alone will not 
justify a finding of corporate presence. 1s2 The court concluded that 
no evidence was adduced that Sietas had sufficient contacts with New 
York. 1s3 
There was similarly no jurisdiction over either Krupp or Sietas 
under C.P.L.R. § 302. 1s4 Plaintiffs conceded that jurisdiction may be 
found under C.P.L.R. § 302 only when the event or occurrence giving 
rise to the cause of action occurred in New York. i s5 Because there 
was no allegation that the Tuxpan had ever been in New York, 
C.P.L.R. § 302 could not provide a basis of jurisdiction. 1s6 The Dis-
trict Court also refused to transfer the proceeding to Federal District 
Court in Texas since plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate that Krupp 
or Sietas would be subject to personal jurisdiction in Texas. 1 s7 
173. Id. 
174. Id. at 1028. 
175. Id. at 1027 (citing N.Y. C1v. PRAC. L. & R. § 301). 
176. Volkswagen, 768 F. Supp. at 1028 (citing N.Y. C1v. PRAC. L. & R. § 302(a)(l)). 
177. Id. 
178. Id. 
179. Id. 
180. Volkswagen, 768 F. Supp. a:t 1028. 
181. Id. 
182. Id. 
183. Id. 
184. Volkswagen, 768 F. Supp. at 1028. 
185. Id. 
186. Id. 
187. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a), 1406(a)). 
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III. FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT 
A. Barkanic v. General Admin. of Civil Aviation of the People's 
Republic of China, 923 F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1991); The F.S.LA. 
requires that courts apply the choice of law rules of the forum state 
with respect to all issues governed by the state's substantive law 
despite the F.S.LA. jurisidictional basis in federal court. 
In Barkanic v. General Admin. of Civil Aviation of the People's 
Republic of China, 188 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals considered 
whether choice of law rules apply to laws limiting liability in a wrong-
ful death action arising out of an airplane crash and whether the Dis-
trict Court applied the correct choice of law rules. In this instance, 
the crash occurred in the People's Republic of China. 189 Two Ameri-
can citizens were killed in the crash. 190 Applying New York choice of 
law provisions, the District Court determined that Chinese law, in-
cluding rules limiting liability to $20,000, should be applied. 191 
The Second Circuit affirmed the lower court decision. The court 
concluded that even though the F.S.I.A. is silent as to choice oflaw, it 
requires courts to apply the choice of law rules of the forum state to 
all issues governed by the forum state's substantive law. 192 The court 
noted that the goal of F.S.I.A. is to make sovereigns liable "in the 
same manner and to the same extent" as individuals.193 Moreover, a 
court sitting in diversity jurisdiction is required to apply state choice 
of law rules when the issues before it are governed by state substantive 
law.194 A federal court sitting in federal question jurisdiction may, 
but is not required to apply federal choice of law provisions. 19s The 
District Court was, therefore, not prohibited from applying the New 
York choice of law provisions. 196 
Under New York choice of law "interest analysis," the law of the 
188. 923 F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1991). 
189. Id. at 958. 
190. Id. 
191. Id. 
192. Barkanic, 923 F.2d at 959 - 60. In First National City Bank v. Banco Para El Comer-
cio Exterior De Cuba, the Supreme Court held that "where state law provides a rule of liability 
governing private individuals, the FSIA requires the application of that rule to foreign states in 
like circumstances." 462 U.S. 611, 622 n.11 (1983) (quoted in Barkanic, 923 F.2d at 959). 
193. Id. at 959 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1606). 
194. Id. at 960 (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)). 
195. Id. at 961 (citing Corporacion Venezolana de Fomento v. Vintero Sales Corp., 629 
F.2d 786, 795 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981)). 
196. Barkanic, 923 F.2d at 961. 
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place with the greater interest in the dispute should be applied. 197 
Typically, this is the law of the place where the accident occurs, un-
less the parties to the suit are domiciliaries of the same state. 198 
Under the New York Court of Appeals ruling in Schultz v. Boy Scouts 
of America, Inc., the New York choice of law provisions apply to loss 
distribution and limitation rules. 199 Applying the New York choice of 
law rules, the District Court correctly determined that the law of 
China controlled, including the rule limiting liability to $20,000. 200 
B. Morgan Guar. Trust Co. v. Republic of Palau, 924 F.2d 1237 
(2d Cir. 1991); United States trust te"itories do not satisfy the 
recognized international criteria for sovereign statehood and therefore 
are not "foreign states" under§ 1441(d) of the F.S.LA. 
In Morgan Guar. Trust Co. v. Republic of Palau,201 plaintiffs ini-
tiated an action to recoup losses incurred as guarantors of defaulted 
loans made to defendant, the Republic of Palau. 202 The action previ-
ously had been removed from New York State Supreme Court under 
the removal jurisdiction of the F.S.I.A.203 The Federal District Court 
entered judgment for the plaintiff. 204 The Second Circuit reversed, 
holding that the Republic of Palau, which was a trust territory of the 
U.S., was not a "foreign state" within the meaning of the F.S.I.A. 
and, therefore, there was no removal jurisdiction under § 1441 ( d) of 
the F.S.I.A.20s 
In 1947, the U.S. was granted a trusteeship of more than 2,100 
islands formerly controlled by Japan.206 Because the trust was desig-
nated a "strategic" trust, the U.S., under the supervision of the U.N. 
Security Council, was entitled to full administrative authority. 207 
Under the Trusteeship Agreement for the Former Japanese Mandated 
197. Id at 962 (citing Babcock v. Jackson, 191N.E.2d279, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 240 N.Y.S.2d 
743 (1963); Neumeier v. Kuehner, 286 N.E.2d 454, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972)). 
198. Id. (citing Neumeier, 286 N.E.2d at 457 - 58, 31 N.Y.2d at 128, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 
70)). 
199. Id. at 963 (citing Schultz v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc., 480 N.E.2d 679, 65 N.Y.2d 
189, 491 N.Y.S.2d 90 (1985)). 
200. Barkanic, 923 F.2d at 963. 
201. 924 F.2d 1237 (2d Cir. 1991). 
202. Id. 
203. Id (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(d), 1603(a)). 
204. Id. 
205. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 924 F.2d at 1247. 
206. Id. at 1239. 
207. Id. (citing U.N. CHARTER art. 83). The supervisory functions over non-strategic 
trusts are conducted by the U.N. General Assembly with the Assistance of the U.N. Trustee-
ship Council. Id. (citing U.N. CHARTER art. 85). 
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Islands208 (Trustee Agreement), the U.S. would provide for the trust 
territory's economic, political and social advancement, including de-
velopment of independence and self-determination. 209 The Trustee-
ship Agreement conferred broad powers on the U.S.: 
The administering authority shall have full powers of administration, 
legislation, and jurisdiction over the territory subject to the provi-
sions of this agreement, and may apply to the trust territory, subject 
to any modifications which the administering authority may consider 
desirable, such laws of the U.S. as it may deem appropriate to local 
conditions and requirements. 210 
Over the years, various islands covered by the Trustee Agreement 
have become independent from the U.S.211 The various islands have 
negotiated agreements with the U.S., changing their political status 
either to that of Commonwealth212 or free association. The Compact 
of Free Association negotiated with Palau which would have shifted 
governmental administration to the Palauans had never been ap-
proved by the Palauan people.21 3 
The Second Circuit concluded that Palau was not a foreign state 
within the meaning of F.S.l.A. § 1603(a).214 In deciding this issue, 
the court relied on the attributes of "sovereign statehood" provided 
208. Trusteeship Agreement for the Former Japanese Mandated Islands, Approved by 
the Security Council on April 2, 1947, entered into force July 18, 1947, 61 Stat. 3301, T.l.A.S. 
No. 1665, 8 U.N.T.S. 189 (1947) [hereinafter Trusteeship Agreement] (cited in Morgan Guar. 
Trust Co., 924 F.2d at 1239). 
209. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 924 F.2d at 1239. 
210. Id. (quoting Trusteeship Agreement, supra note 208). 
211. Id. 
212. In 1986, the U.S. terminated the Trusteeship Agreement and acknowledged Com-
monwealth status with regard to the Northern Mariana Islands, the Republic of the Marshall 
Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia. Id. (citing Proclamation No. 5564, 3 C.F.R. 
§ 146 (1986)). 
213. The first two Compacts submitted to the Palauans included a provision that a sepa-
rate agreement would be entered into to allow the U.S. to locate nuclear devices in Palau. 
Under the Paulauan Constitution, 75% of the voters must approve any agreement that autho-
rizes use, testing or storage of nuclear weapons. The agreement did not receive the required 
75% approval. The Compact was subsequently renegotiated to allow the U.S. to operate nu-
clear capable vessels and aircraft in Palauan territory without confirming or denying the pres-
ence of nuclear weapons. Although the agreement received 72% approval, the agreement was 
thought not to be subject to the 75% requirement. Aft~r approval by Congress and the Presi-
dent, however, the Palauan Supreme Court ruled that the revisions did not remove the agree-
ment from the scope of the 75% requirement and that the Compact was therefore not 
approved. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 924 F.2d at 1240 (citing Gibbons v. Salii, No. 8 - 86 (Sup. 
Ct. Palau, App. Div. 1986)). 
214. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 924 F.2d at 1244. Section 1603(a) of the F.S.l.A. provides 
that a " 'foreign state'. . . includes a political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or 
instrumentality of a foreign state .... " Id. at 1243 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a)). 
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by the Supreme Court in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export 
Corp.,21 s which include the power to declare and wage war, to con-
clude peace, to maintain diplomatic ties with other sovereigns, to ac-
quire territory and to make international agreements.216 In support of 
its determination that Palau was not a foreign state, the court also 
cited the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the 
United States217 (Restatement). The Restatement defines a state as an 
entity possessed of territory and permanent population, controlled by 
a government and capable of engaging in international relations.218 
These characteristics of statehood accord with generally accepted in-
ternational law definitions referred to by the court. 219 
Under the terms of the Trusteeship Agreement, Palau does not 
possess the powers of statehood recognized in U.S. courts and under 
international law. 220 The full power of administration, legislation and 
foreign relations of Palau is still vested in the U.S. as trustee.221 Ac-
cording to the Second Circuit, Palau will continue as a trust territory 
and not as a foreign sovereign until the trusteeship is terminated. 222 
The court's ruling leaves Palau as being neither a part of the U.S.,223 
nor a foreign state for the purposes of removal jurisdiction under 
§ 1603(a) of the F.S.l.A.224 Since there was no basis for removal ju-
risdiction, the action was remanded to state court. 
C. Shapiro v. Republic of Bolivia, 930 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir. 1991); 
Foreign states' issuance of a public debt instrument in the U.S. is an 
activity which falls within the meaning of the "commercial activity" 
exception of the F.S.LA. and thus there is federal subject matter 
jurisdiction. 
Shapiro v. Republic of Bolivia,22s arose out of a transaction initi-
ated in 1981 in which defendant, the Bolivian government, sought to 
purchase fifty-two used NATO military aircraft through an agent in 
215. 299 U.S. 304, 318 - 19 (1936) (cited in Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 924 F.2d at 1243). 
216. Id. 
217. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES§ 201 (1987) (cited in Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 924 F.2d at 1243). 
218. Id. § 206 (cited in Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 924 F.2d at 1243 - 44). 
219. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 924 F.2d at 1243 - 44. 
220. Id. at 1244. 
221. Id. 
222. Id. at 1246. 
223. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 924 F.2d at 1244 (citing U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2). 
224. Id. 
225. 930 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir. 1991). 
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the U.S., International Promotions and Ventures, Ltd. (I.P.V.L.).226 
Pursuant to U.S. regulations the entire transaction was subject to ap-
proval of the U.S. government.227 The contract between Bolivia and 
I.P.V.L. required that the purchase price of $81 million was to be paid 
by forty promissory notes guaranteed by the Central Bank of Bo-
livia. 228 But, ifthe approval of the U.S. government was not obtained, 
I.P.V.L. would return the notes.229 Notes 1 through 10 were deliv-
ered to the Government of Belgium and notes 11 through 40 were 
delivered to I.P.V.L.230 Subsequently, in 1983, the U.S. refused to 
approve the transaction and Bolivia requested that the notes be re-
turned. 231 All of the notes were returned except for numbers 12 and 
21 through 40 which I.P.V.L. refused to return.232 Subsequently, Bo-
livia prevailed in litigation regarding the notes. 233 
In December 1986, Shapiro initiated an action in the Southern 
District of New York against Bolivia claiming that he was a rightful 
holder of the notes and seeking payment of their face value, 
$1,426,000.234 Prior to any discovery, Bolivia moved for dismissal on 
the grounds of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 23~ The District 
Court granted the motion, ruling that Bolivia's activities did not con-
stitute a waiver of their immunity granted under the F.S.I.A.,236 nor 
did it come within the "commercial activity" exception to 
immunity. 237 
The Second Circuit disagreed. The court held that the F.S.I.A. is 
the exclusive source of feqeral jurisdiction in suits involving foreign 
sovereigns. 238 The general rule is that "a foreign state shall be im-
mune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States . 
226. Id. at 1015. 
227. Id. (citing Licenses for the Export of Defense Articles: Non-transfer and Use Assur-
ances and Congressional Notification, 22 C.F.R. § 123.10 (1990)). 
228. Id. 
229. Shapiro, 930 F.2d at 1015. 
230. Id. 
231. Id. 
232. Id. 
233. Shapiro, 930 F.2d at 1015. The merits of the subsequent litigation between l.P.V.L. 
and the Republic of Bolivia are not relevant here. See Office of the Comptroller General v. 
Int'l Promotions and Ventures, Ltd., 618 F. Supp. 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). Bolivia prevailed in 
the subsequent litigation, however, with l.P.V.L. being ordered to return the notes or alterna-
tively pay monetary damages. 
234. Id. 
235. Id. at 1016. 
236. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2) - (4), 144l(d), 1602 - 11 (1988)). 
237. Shapiro, 930 F.2d at 1016 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2)). 
238. Id. at 1017 (citing Morel de Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 748 F.2d 790, 793 (2d Cir. 
1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1125 (1985)). 
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except as provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter. " 239 Sec-
tions 1605(a)(l) and (2) of the F.S.l.A. codify the waiver and com-
mercial activity exceptions to immunity: 
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of 
the United States ... in any case: 
(1) in which the foreign state has waived its immunity either ex-
plicitly or by implication . . . [;] 
2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity car-
ried on in the United States by the foreign state; or upon an act 
performed in the United States in connection with a commercial 
activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the 
territory of the United States in connection with a commercial 
activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct 
effect in the United States.240 
The Second Circuit agreed with the District Court that an implied 
waiver of immunity could not be found. 241 The court noted that fed-
eral courts have construed § 1605(a)(l) narrowly to include only cir-
cumstances where the waiver is unmistakable and unambiguous.242 
Such circumstances may include situations where a sovereign has 
agreed to arbitration in another country, where the sovereign has 
agreed that the law of another country should govern a contract or 
where the sovereign has filed a responsive pleading without raising 
sovereign immunity defense.243 The court refused to extend the appli-
cation of§ 1605(a)(l) to situations where the foreign sovereign initi-
ates an unrelated action. 244 Although Bolivia initiated the suit on the 
contract underlying the promissory note at issue, the court refused to 
hold that waiver of immunity in a particular action affects waiver of 
immunity in related, yet distinct actions. 24s 
The Second Circuit found, however, that the issuance of a prom-
issory note inside the U.S. is a sufficient commercial activity within 
the meaning of§ 1605(a)(2) of the F.S.l.A. for jurisdiction.246 The 
239. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (quoted in Shapiro, 930 F.2d at 1017). 
240. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (quoted in Shapiro, 930 F.2d at 1017). 
241. Shapiro, 930 F.2d at 1017. 
242. Id. at 1017 (citing Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 905 F.2d 
438, 444 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Joseph v. Office of the Consulate General, 830 F.2d 1018, 1022 (9th 
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 905 (1990); Frolova v. U.S.S.R., 761 F.2d 370, 377 (7th Cir. 
1985); L'Europeenne de Banque v. La Republica de Venezuela, 700 F. Supp. 114, 123 
(S.D.N.Y. 1988)). 
243. Id. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1976) reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6617). 
244. Id. at 1018. 
245. Shapiro, 930 F.2d at 1017 - 18. 
246. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2)). 
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court stated that commercial activity under the F.S.I.A. includes 
"either a regular course of commercial conduct or a particular com-
mercial transaction or act. "247 Commercial activity carried on in the 
U.S. includes "commercial activity carried on by such [sovereign] 
state and having substantial contact with the United States."248 The 
court concluded that the issuance of debt instruments in the U.S. is a 
commercial activity constituting substantial contact with the U.S.249 
Undoubtably, issuance of commercial debt instruments is a commer-
cial activity.2so Whether or not the notes are actually discounted in 
the U.S., they are negotiable under U.S. laws.2s1 The court reasoned 
that the U.S. has a strong interest in all capital raising activities 
within its borders.2s2 Their issuance in the U.S. is, therefore, a com-
mercial activity within the meaning of§ 1605(a)(2) and federal courts 
have subject matter jurisdiction over actions for payment on the 
notes.2s3 
D. Weltover, Inc. v. Republic of Argentina, 753 F. Supp. 1201 
(S.D.N.Y.), ajf'd, 941 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 112 S. 
Ct. 858 (1992); Subject matter jurisdiction exists where the issuance 
of debt obligations in the U.S. by Banco Central of Argentina fell 
within the "commercial activity" exception to the F.S.LA. 
Furthermore, the exercise of personal jurisdiction did not violate the 
defendants' due process rights based on the minimum contacts test. 
In Weltover v. Republic of Argentina,2s4 the District Court ad-
dressed the applicability of the commercial activity exception to the 
F.S.I.A. in the context of debt instruments issued by a foreign govern-
ment in the U.s.2ss As part of a program to stabilize the devaluation 
of Argentinean currency on global, markets defendant Republic of 
Argentina, issued indentures through defendant Banco Central De La 
Republica Argentina (Banco Central) designated as "Registered 
Bonds Denominated in United States Dollars."2s6 Argentina's For-
247. Id. at 1018 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d)). 
248. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1603(e)). 
249. Shapiro, 930 F.2d at 1019 - 20. 
250. Id. 
251. Id. at 1020. 
252. Id. 
253. Shapiro, 930 F.2d at 1020 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2)). 
254. 753 F. Supp. 1201 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 941 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 112 
S. Ct. 858 (1992). The district court's ruling in Weltover of January 1991 was made prior to 
the Second Circuit's ruling in Shapiro of April 1991, supra text at 111.C. 
255. Id. at 1204 - 05. 
256. Id. at 1203. 
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eign Exchange Insurance Contracts program allowed Argentinean 
debtors to repay foreign loans in U.S. dollars by exchanging local cur-
rency for dollars at specified exchange rates through Banco Cen-
tral. 257 As Argentine debts came due, Banco Central had insufficient 
dollars to cover the loans and issued bonods and promissory notes to 
raise the necessary U.S. dollars.258 The terms of the bonods provided 
that payment would be made in U.S. dollars on scheduled dates in 
1986 and 1987 and would bear interest at the prevailing London In-
terbank rate for 180-day Eurodollar deposits. 259 Plaintiffs held more 
than $1,300,000 in bonods.260 
As the bonods matured, however, the Argentine Ministry of the 
Economy notified plaintiffs that payment on the bonods would not be 
made when due and requested plaintiffs to participate in a "roll over" 
of those obligations.261 Plaintiffs sued for enforcement of the terms of 
the bonods, contending that Banco Central was in default.262 Defend-
ants moved for dismissal alleging that the District Court lacked sub-
ject matter jurisdiction under the F.S.I.A.,263 that exercise of personal 
jurisdiction over defendants violated due process264 and that the com-
plaint should have been dismissed under the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens. 265 The District Court denied defendants' motion on each 
claim.266 
The District Court noted first that although a sovereign's actions 
relating to a currency stabilization program may be immune from suit 
under the F.S.I.A., the issuance of debt obligations in the U.S. by 
Banco Central fell within the commercial activity exception to the 
F.S.I.A.267 The court reasoned that sovereigns do not enjoy immu-
nity under F.S.I.A. when the cause of action arises out of a commer-
cial activity in the U.S., when the act performed in the U.S. supports 
commercial activity elsewhere or when the act performed elsewhere 
has a direct effect in the U.S.268 Applicability of the exception turns 
on the determination of whether the activities were "commercial" and 
257. Id. 
258. Weltover, 753 F. Supp. at 1203. 
259. Id. 
260. Id. at 1203 n.1. 
261. Id. at 1204. 
262. Weltover, 753 F. Supp. at 1204. 
263. Id. 
264. Id. at 1207. 
265. Id. at 1208 - 09. 
266. Weltover, 753 F. Supp. at 1209. 
267. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (cited in Weltover, 730 F. Supp. at 1205 - 06). 
268. Weltover, 753 F. Supp. at 1206. 
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whether they had sufficient nexus with the U.S.269 
The commercial character of an activity is assessed according to 
the nature of the activity rather than its purpose. 27° Courts have con-
strued activity as commercial in nature if the activity is ordinarily 
engaged in by private entities rather than sovereigns.271 The court 
ruled that although currency stabilization is unique to sovereigns, Ar-
gentina's issuance of debt instruments through Banco Central was a 
commercial activity not unique to sovereigns. 272 Thus, the court con-
cluded that the contract cause of action for enforcement of the debt 
instruments did not become imbued with immunity merely because 
they had been issued as part of a currency control policy. 273 
The District Court further concluded that Banco Central had 
sufficient nexus with the U.S. to fall within the exception to F.S.I.A. 
immunity.274 The only possible basis under which the court could 
find an exception to F.S.l.A. immunity was by finding that the issu-
ance of the debt instruments had a direct effect in the U.S., because 
the activity in question did not involve commercial activity carried on 
in the U.S. or an action performed in the U.S. in furtherance of com-
mercial activity elsewhere. 275 The Second Circuit had previously con-
cluded that nonpayment of debt payable in the U.S. to a U.S. 
company constitutes a direct effect for the purposes of the F.S.l.A.276 
Analogous to the situation where the payee is a U.S. company, when 
the payee is a foreign company, nonpayment in the U.S. is deemed to 
have effect in the U.S.277 Nonpayment of debt in the U.S. has a direct 
effect in the U.S. regardless of the domicile of the payee.278 The 
choice to make and accept payment in New York through New York 
financial centers sufficiently implicates U.S. interests.279 
The District Court additionally rejected defendants' claims that 
the exercise of personal jurisdiction violates due process. 280 Applying 
269. Id. 
270. Id. at 1205 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d)). 
271. Id. (citing H. Rep. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., at 16, 1976, reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6615 ("if an activity is customarily carried on for profit, its commercial 
nature could readily be assumed")). 
272. Weltover, 753 F. Supp. at 1206. 
273. Id. 
274. Id. at 1207. 
275. Id. at 1206. 
276. Weltover, 753 F. Supp. at 1206 (citing Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal 
Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 308 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982)). 
277. Id. 
278. Id. at 1207. 
279. Id. 
280. Weltover, 753 F. Supp. at 1208. 
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the "minimum contacts" test, the court concluded that plaintiffs' al-
leged facts demonstrated contacts sufficient to exercise personal juris-
diction. 281 For instance, Banco Central had promised to make 
payments in New York in U.S. dollars; the Argentine government 
maintains consulates throughout the country; Banco Central con-
ducts other commercial activities in the U.S.; and both defendants 
maintain bank accounts in the U.s.282 
Finally, the court rejected defendants' arguments for dismissal 
on grounds of forum non conveniens because defendants failed to pro-
duce evidence demonstrating that Argentina would be a more appro-
priate forum. 283 Additionally, the defendants did not provide the 
court with a list of witnesses they would call at a trial and the wit-
nesses's addresses which have been held to be a prerequisite for a dis-
missal on forum non conviens grounds. 284 The District Court stated 
further that proof of plaintiffs' claims would be predominantly docu-
mentary in nature,285 thus the continuation of the action in the U.S. 
would not prejudice defendants. 286 
IV. EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF U.S. LAW 
A. Alfadda v. Fenn, 935 F.2d 475 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. 
Ct. 638 (1991); Subject matter jurisdiction exists under RICO and 
under the Securities Exchange Act where uncontested a/legations of 
fraud occurring in the U.S. were made by the defendants, giving rise 
to claims under both acts . . 
In A/fadda v. Fenn,281 the Second Circuit concluded that U.S. 
courts have subject matter jurisdiction over securities fraud claims 
with a foreign nexus.288 Specifically, U.S. courts have jurisdiction in 
cases which arise out of sales of stock negotiated and concluded in the 
U.S. even though such sales occurred notwithstanding a prospectus 
given to plaintiffs outside of the U.S. which stated that there would be 
281. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (cited in Weltover, 
753 F. Supp. at 1208). 
282. Weltover, 753 F. Supp. at 1208. 
283. Id. at 1209. 
284. Id. 
285. Id. 
286. Weltover, 753 F. Supp. at 1209. 
287. 935 F.2d 475 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 638 (1991). In addition to common 
law claims, plaintiffs claim violations of§ lO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 
U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988), Rule lOb - 5 of the Securities Exchange Commission, 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.lOb - 5 (1990) and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 
1962(a) - (d) (1988)[hereinafter RICO]. Id. at 476 n.1. 
288. Id. at 478. 
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no sales inside the U.S.289 
Plaintiffs' claims arose out of stock purchased by plaintiffs in de-
fendant Saudi European Investment Corporation (S.E.I.C.) in 1979 
and a subsequent S.E.I.C. stock offering in 1984.290 Under the terms 
of the 1979 offering, plaintiffs were to be given a preference in subse-
quent offerings, in proportion to their holdings in order to maintain 
their relative voting strengths in S.E.I.C.291 The prospectus for the 
1984 offering stated that there would be a 30: 1 split of the shares is-
sued in the 1979 offering, thereby creating 600,000 S.E.I.C. shares.292 
An additional 600,000 voting shares would be issued at $100 per 
share, and in the event of an oversubscription, 1,800,000 non-voting 
shares would be issued.293 The S.E.I.C. prospectus specifically pro-
vided that shares would not "be offered or sold directly or indirectly 
in the United States."294 
Plaintiffs contended that despite the 1984 limitation on the 
number of voting shares to be issued, S.E.I.C. issued 1,200,000 new 
voting shares in the 1984 offering. 29s Because plaintiffs relied on the 
1984 prospectus to determine what purchases would be necessary to 
preserve their voting strength in S.E.I.C., they claimed that the sale of 
voting shares in excess of 600,000 fraudulently diluted their voting 
interests. 296 In further contradiction to information contained in the 
1984 prospectus, 180,000 voting shares were sold to Lincoln Savings 
and Loan Association (Lincoln), a subsidiary of American Continen-
tal297 in the U.S. through an off-shore shell company in the Nether-
lands Antilles. 298 The District Court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims, 
holding that the fraudulent act was the passing of the 1984 prospectus 
which occurred outside the U.s.299 
On appeal, the Second Circuit found that, among the relevant 
fraudulent acts, was the negotiation and sale of S.E.I.C. stock to Lin-
coln in the U.S.300 The court noted that the Securities Exchange Act 
289. Id. 
290. Id. at 477. 
291. Alfadda, 935 F.2d at 477. 
292. Id. 
293. Id. 
294. Id. 
295. Alfadda, 935 F.2d at 477. 
296. Id. 
297. Charles Keating was the chairman of American Continental and he was involved in 
the negotiation and purchase of SEIC stock. Id. at 477 - 78. 
298. Id. at 477. 
299. Alfadda v. Fenn, 751 F. Supp. 1114, 1118 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
300. Alfadda, 935 F.2d at 479. 
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is silent as to extraterritorial application.301 The courts, however, 
have defined two tests for determining whether a federal court has 
subject matter jurisdiction over a foreign plaintiff's claim under the 
antifraud provisions of the securities law.302 First, under the "con-
duct" test, federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction if (1) the 
defendant's conduct in the U.S. was more than mere preparation for 
fraud and (2) specific acts within the U.S. directly caused losses to 
foreign investors abroad. 303 Second, under the "effects" test, the fed-
eral courts have jurisdiction if illegal activity abroad has a "substan-
tial effect" within the U.S.304 The Second Circuit found a basis for 
subject matter jurisdiction under the "conduct" test. 305 The defend-
ants' conduct in negotiating the sale of S.E.l.C. stock to Lincoln, 
although not acknowledged by the District Court as acts more than 
merely preparatory for fraud, were considered by the Second Circuit 
to be conduct material to the consummation of fraud. 306 
The court further noted that although Lincoln purchased 
S.E.I.C. shares through Lincoln American Investments, N.V., a 
Netherlands Antilles company created by American Continental spe-
cifically for the purpose of purchasing and holding S.E.l.C. shares 
outside of the U.S., this fact did not diminish the federal court's sub-
ject matter jurisdiction. 301 
Similar to the Securities Exchange Act, the Racketeer Influenced 
and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) is silent as to extraterritorial 
application. 308 The Second Circuit has previously rejected arguments 
circumscribing the extraterritorial application of RICO: 
On its face the prescription [against acquiring an "enterprise"] is all 
inclusive. It permits no inference that the [RICO] Act was intended 
to have a parochial application. The legislative history, moreover, 
indicates the intent of Congress that this provision be broadly con-
301. Id. at 478 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1988)). 
302. Id. (citing Psimenos v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 722 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1983)(quoting 
Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975))). 
303. Id. (citing Psimenos, 722 F.2d at 1046; Bersch, 519 F.2d at 993). 
304. Alfadda, 935 F.2d at 479 (citing Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 
871 F.2d 252, 261 - 62 (2d Cir. 1989)). 
305. Id. 
306. Id. 
307. The Second Circuit quoted the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of 
the United States § 416(d) (1987): "The United States may generally exercise jurisdiction to 
prescribe with respect to conduct occurring predominantly in the United States that is related 
to a transaction in securities, even if the transaction takes place outside the United States." Id. 
(emphasis added). 
308. Alfadda, 935 F.2d at 479 (citing Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, 
18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961 - 1968). 
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strued. . . . In short, we find no indication that Congress intended to 
limit Title IX [RICO] to infiltration of domestic enterprises. On the 
contrary, the salutary purposes of the Act would be frustrated by 
such construction. 309 
The fact that defendants were foreign entities did not immunize 
them. 310 The Second Circuit recognized the negotiations and sale 
which occurred primarily in the U.S. as the pattern of activity giving 
rise to a RICO claim.311 The federal courts, therefore, have a basis 
for subject matter jurisdiction over the RICO claim.312 
V. ADMIRALTY AND SHIPPING 
A. State Trading Corp. of India v. Assuranceforeningen Skuld, 
921 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1990); Federal courts sitting in an admiralty 
action must apply federal choice of law rules. 
In State Trading Corp. of India v. Assuranceforeningen Skuld, 313 
the Second Circuit examined choice of law questions in admiralty 
cases and held that courts sitting in admiralty jurisdiction must apply 
federal choice of law rules.314 Plaintiff State Trading Corporation had 
obtained in prior litigation a judgment against the owners of the M. V. 
Go-Go Runner to recoup for cargo lost when the Go-Go Runner 
sank.31s Plaintiffs initiated this action against Assuranceforeningen, 
the insurer of the Go-Go Runner, for payment of a prior judgment 
pursuant to a Connecticut statute which allowed for a direct action 
suit against the insurer to recover on judgments obtained against an 
insured. 316 The District Court granted summary judgment for de-
fendant, holding that the Connecticut statute was inapplicable in an 
admiralty action.317 The Second Circuit affirmed the granting of sum-
mary judgment in favor of defendant.31s 
The Second Circuit reasoned that, unlike courts sitting in diver-
sity jurisdiction, federal courts sitting in an admiralty action must ap-
ply federal choice of law rules. 319 Following Lauritzen v. Larsen,320 
309. Id. (quoting United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 
U.S. 1105 (1975)). 
310. Id. 
311. Id. at 479 - 80. 
312. Alfadda, 935 F.2d at 480. 
313. 921 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1990). 
314. Id. at 414. 
315. Id. at 411. 
316. Id. (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38 - 175 (1989)). 
317. State Trading Corp. of India, 921 F.2d at 411 - 12. 
318. Id. at 418. 
319. Id. at 414~ 
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the court resolved the conflict of law issue by "ascertaining and valu-
ing points of contact between the transaction and the states or govern-
ments whose competing laws are involved."321 The court noted that 
although Lauritzen has been generally applied in tort contexts, emerg-
ing rules for choice of law in admiralty contract actions have been 
modeled on it. 322 
The contract was concluded in Norway; the vessel was Panama-
nian; it sank off the coast of Africa; the vessel was en route from 
South America to India. 323 The only connection with Connecticut 
was that defendant Skuld had an agent there. 324 Thus, under a Lau-
ritzen analysis, the Second Circuit found Connecticut law 
inapplicable. 32s 
B. Fednav, Ltd. v. Isoramar, S.A., 925 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1991); 
Subject matter of a contract to make contribution for losses incurred 
during shipping was not itself a maritime contract over which federal 
courts have subject matter jurisdiction. 
In Fednav, Ltd. v. Isoramar, S.A., 326 the Second Circuit held that 
an agreement to make contribution for losses incurred during ship-
ping was not a maritime contract over which the federal courts have 
subject matter jurisdiction.327 Plaintiff Fednav, a Canadian corpora-
tion, leased a ship to carry steel from West Germany to Chicago, Illi-
nois from defendant Isoramar, a Panamanian corporation.328 The 
cargo was damaged en route to Illinois. 329 The marine underwriter as 
subrogee subsequently sued Fednav and Isoramar for the amount of 
damages to the steel.33° Fednav settled that suit and paid the under-
writer $5,000.331 Fednav sought contribution from Isoramar for half 
320. 345 U.S. 571 (1953)(cited in State Trading Corp. of India, 921 F.2d at 417). 
321. Id. at 582 (cited in State Trading Corp. of India, 921 F.2d at 417). 
322. State Trading Corp. oflndia, 921 F.2d at 417 (citing Eagle Leasing Corp. v. Hart-
ford Fire Ins. Co., 540 F.2d 1257, 1261 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 967 (1977)(The 
law of the state where the contract was issued and delivered governs.); Healy Tibbitts Constr. 
Co. v. Foremost Ins. Co., 482 F. Supp. 830 (N.D. Cal. 1979)(The controlling law is the "law of 
the state with the most significant nexus with the contract.")). 
323. Id. 
324. Id. 
325. Id. 
326. 925 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1991). 
327. Id. at 601 - 02. 
328. Id. at 600. 
329. Id. 
330. Fednav, 925 F.2d at 600. 
331. Id. 
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the principal settlement amount plus attorneys fees. 332 Fednav al-
leged that Isoramar, through its representative, agreed to pay the re-
quested contribution.333 Isoramar, however, never paid the 
amount. 334 As a result, Fednav brought suit against Isoramar alleg-
ing a breach of the agreement due to Isoramar's failure to pay 
contribution. 335 
Upon commencement of the action in the District Court, Fednav 
applied for, and received, a writ of maritime attachment and garnish-
ment on Isoramar's bank account pursuant to admiralty law.336 The 
District Court subsequently dismissed the action and vacated the at-
tachment for want of subject matter jurisdiction. 337 The District 
Court held that the action, though sounding in admiralty, was merely 
a breach of contract claim arising under state law. 338 
The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that the agreement to make 
contribution was not a maritime contract over which the federal 
courts have subject matter jurisdiction. 339 The court stated that a 
maritime contract would exist if the direct subject matter of the con-
tract related to the use of a ship, commerce or navigation of navigable 
waters, transportation by sea or maritime employment.340 However, 
courts have previously held that entering into a contract as a surety, 
thereby agreeing to pay for another's breach of a maritime contract, is 
not itself a maritime contract. 341 The rationale for this rule is that a 
promise to pay contract damages involves neither maritime services 
nor maritime transportation.342 Thus, the Fednav-Isoramar agree-
ment allegedly breached in this case was a separate and distinct con-
tract not involving maritime services. 343 
The court also declined to look to the subject matter of the un-
derlying contract as a basis for jurisdiction. 344 The Second Circuit 
332. Id. 
333. Id. 
334. Fednav, 925 F.2d at 600. 
335. Id. 
336. Id. at 600 - 01. The writ was issued pursuant to Supplemental Rules for Certain 
Admiralty and Maritime Claims, FED. R. C1v. P. B(l). Id. 
337. Id. at 601. 
338. Fednav, 925 F.2d at 601. 
339. Id. at 601 - 02. 
340. Id. at 601 (citing Ingersoll Milling Machine Co. v. M/V Bodena, 829 F.2d 293, 302 
(2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1042 (1988)). 
341. Id. (quoting Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 735 (1961)). 
342. Fednav, 925 F.2d at 601 (quoting Pacific Surety Co. v. Leatham & Smith Towing & 
Wrecking Co., 151 F. 440, 443 (7th Cir. 1907)). 
343. Id. at 601 - 02. 
344. Id. at 602. 
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stated that because Isoramar was not a party to the cargo action or 
the settlement, the Fednav-Isoramar agreement was collateral to the 
settlement agreement and "cannot serve as the basis for initiating an 
[independent] action in admiralty for specific performance."345 
C. Seguros "Illimani" S.A. v. M/V POPI P, 929 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 
1991 ); A stevedore is subject to the warranty of workmanlike service 
implied by admiralty law, based upon the stevedore's contract with 
the carrier. Furthermore, an ingot does not constitute a ''package" 
under COGSA, but a bundle of ingots is a ''package" under COGSA. 
In Seguros ''11/imani" S.A. v. M/V POPI P, 346 the Second Circuit 
addressed the issue of whether a stevedore is subject to the warranty 
of workmanlike service implied by admiralty law347 and what defini-
tion of "package" should be employed in applying the $500 per pack-
age liability limitation provision of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 
(COGSA).348 The action arose out of the transport of 8996 ingots of 
tin from Bolivia to New York aboard the POPI P.349 The ingots were 
organized into 600 steel strapped bundles, of which 599 bundles con-
tained 15 ingots each, and 1 bundle contained 11 ingots.350 Upon the 
POPI P's arrival in New York, the ingots were unloaded and stored 
by the stevedore, Universal Maritime Service Corporation (Univer-
sal), under the terms of several bills of lading. 351 After storage for 
three days, two containers holding 67 of the steel strapped bundles 
( 1005 ingots) were discovered missing. 3s2 
In an action brought by the insurer of the shipment, the POPI P 
sought indemnification from the stevedore, Universal, based on an 
implied warranty of workmanlike conduct. 353 The trial court held 
that Universal must indemnify the POPI P, but given the COOSA 
liability limitation, only $500 for each of the 67 steel strapped bundles 
could be recovered. 3s4 
The Second Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision. The 
345. Id. (quoting Pedersen v. M/V Ocean Leader, 578 F. Supp. 1534, 1535 (W.D. Wash. 
1984)). 
346. 929 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1991). 
347. Id. at 92 - 93. 
348. Id. at 93 - 95 (citing Carriage of Goods by Sea Act§ 4(5), 46 U.S.C.A. § 1304(5)). 
349. Id. at 91. 
350. Seguros "Illimani" S.A., 929 F.2d at 91. 
351. Id. 
352. Id. at 91 - 92. 
353. See Seguros "Illimani" S.A. v. M/V Popi P, 735 F. Supp. 108, 112 - 13 (S.D.N.Y. 
1990). 
354. Id. at 112. 
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Second Circuit reasoned that, under admiralty law, each contract for 
services between a carrier and a stevedore contains an implied war-
ranty of workmanlike services upon which carriers may make a claim 
of indemnification. 3ss The warranty imposes a broad range of obliga-
tions including the duty to provide proper storage356 and safe equip-
ment, 357 the duty to deliver goods to the right party358 and the duty to 
account for the mysterious disappearance of cargo from the steve-
dore's custody.359 The court held that stevedores may be liable under 
the implied warranty even in the absence of negligence. 360 It noted, 
however, that a stevedore can escape liability if the carrier's conduct 
hindered the stevedore's ability to perform in a workmanlike man-
. ner. 361 Because Universal only claimed that it was not negligent in 
the storage of the ingots, the court affirmed the District Court's ruling 
that Universal was in breach of the implied warranty.362 
In determining to what grouping of ingots the COOSA§ 1304(5) 
limitation of liability extended over, the court noted that the limita-
tion applied as a matter of law only after the goods have been loaded 
and until they are removed from the ship.363 In this case, however, 
the parties had specified as a contractual term in the bills of lading 
that the COOSA § 1304( 5) limitation would apply to the post-dis-
charge period and to Universal as the carrier's stevedore.364 The con-
struction of the term "package" was therefore a matter of contract 
interpretation, not statutory interpretation. 365 
The court construed the term by looking to the bills of lading as 
evidence of the parties' intent, i.e. whether the number of packages 
specified on each bill of lading referred to ingots, bundles or numbers 
of bundles. 366 If the number of packages specified on the bills of lad-
ing totaled 600, for example, then the court could conclude that the 
355. Seguros "Illimani" S.A., 929 F.2d at 92 (citing Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlan-
tic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124, 132 - 34 (1956)). 
356. Id. at 92 - 93 (citing Ryan, 350 U.S. at 133). 
357. Id. at 93 (quoting Italia Societa Per Azioni Di Navagazione v. Oregon Stevedoring 
Co., 376 U.S. 315, 320 (1964)). 
358. Id. at 92 (citing David Crystal, Inc. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 339 F.2d 295, 299 (2d Cir. 
1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 976 (1965)). 
359. Seguros "Illimani" S.A., 929 F.2d at 92 (citing Stein Hall & Co. v. S.S. Concordia 
Viking, 494 F.2d 287 (2d Cir. 1974)). 
360. Id. at 93. 
361. Id. 
362. Id. 
363. Seguros "Illimani" S.A., 929 F.2d at 93 (citing 46 U.S.C. § 1301(e)(1988)). 
364. Id. 
365. Id. 
366. Id. at 94. 
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contract defined a "package" as a bundle of ingots. 367 The bills of 
lading, however, appeared to specify individual ingots as the number 
of packages. 368 Thus, although the bills of lading referred to individ-
ual ingots as packages, the Second Circuit rejected that interpretation 
and held that individual ingots could not constitute a package under 
COOSA. 369 The court had previously held that a package for 
COOSA purposes must be comprised of individual units wrapped, 
tied or bundled. 370 The Second Circuit proceeded to use the number 
of bundles reflected on the bills of lading as an indication of the par-
ties' intent, since a bundle is a package under COOSA.371 As a result, 
the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court's ruling which awarded 
$500 for each of the 67 missing bundles. 372 
D. National Petrochemical Co. of Iran v. MIT Stolt Sheaf, 930 
F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1991); An otherwise legal and enforceable 
contract for carriage is illegal and unenforceable if it is part of an 
overall scheme to violate a U.S. law imposing a trade embargo 
against Iran. 
In National Petrochemical Company of Iran v. The MIT Stolt 
Sheaf, 373 the Second Circuit held that a legal and enforceable contract 
for carriage was illegal and unenforceable because it was part of an 
overall scheme to violate a trade embargo against Iran. 374 In this 
case, plaintiff National Petrochemical Company (N.P.C.) sought to 
recover the proceeds from the sale of chemicals it owned and shipped 
on defendant carrier.37s In April 1980, President Carter signed Exec-
utive Order 12205 proscribing the "sale, supply or other transfer, by 
any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, of any 
items, commodities or products ... from the United States ... either 
to or destined for Iran."376 In June 1980, N.P.C. arranged to 
purchase industrial chemicals and supplies through a United Arab 
Emirates (U .A.E) middleman, Monnris Enterprises, from Rotex, a 
367. Seguros "Illimani" S.A., 929 F.2d at 94. 
368. Id. at 94 - 95. 
369. Id. at 95. 
370. Id. (quoting Mitsui & Co. v. American Export Lines, Inc., 636 F.2d 807, 822 (2d 
Cir. 1981)). 
371. Seguros "Illimani" S.A., 929 F.2d at 95. 
372. Id. 
373. 930 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1991). 
374. Id. at 243. 
375. Id. at 242. 
376. Id. at 241 (citing 45 Fed. Reg. 24,099 (1980)). 
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German interest. 377 Although all documents called for shipping from 
Western European or U.A.E. ports, the chemicals were purchased 
from U.S. sources and shipped from the U.S. on the MIT Stolt 
Sheaf. 378 The original charter party noted delivery was to have been 
in Barcelona, Spain, but did not specify N.P.C. or any Iranian nation-
als as the ultimate recipient of the cargo. 379 Instead, the charter party 
stated that the chemicals would be · discharged to Monnris Enter-
prises. 380 A subsequent addendum to the charter party, however, 
specified a destination in Iran. 381 
After the Stolt Sheaf left the U.S. and approached Iran, the Iran-
Iraq war broke out. 382 The owners of the Stolt Sheaf invoked the war 
risk clause of the charter party and requested that Rotex, the German 
agent which was acting through a Swiss affiliate due to West Ger-
many's restrictions on trade with Iran, specify an alternate destina-
tion. 383 Rotex specified Taiwan where Rotex sold the chemicals. 384 
N.P.C. sued to recover the proceeds of that sale, alleging that the de-
fendants "negligently and conspiratorily allowed Rotex to divert and 
resell the chemicals. " 33s The District Court granted defendants' mo-
tion for summary judgment holding that the contract was unenforce-
able under the Executive Order.386 
The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that although the legality 
of the charter party was arguable, it was indisputably part of a larger 
"scheme to transport the cargoes for payment of monies between the 
U.S. and Iran, without detection in contravention of the then existing 
laws and trade embargoes between the two countries. " 387 The fact 
that the original charter party governing carriage from the U.S. itself 
did not specify Iran as the destination or Iranians as purchasers did 
377. National Petrochemical Co. of Iran, 930 F.2d at 241. 
378. Id. 
379. Id. at 241 - 42. 
380. Id at 242. 
381. National Petrochemical Co. of Iran, 930 F.2d at 242. 
382. Id. 
383. Id. 
384. Id. 
385. National Petrochemical Co. of Iran, 930 F.2d at 242. 
386. National Petrochemical Co. oflran v. MIT Stolt Sheaf, 722 F. Supp. 54 (S.D.N.Y. 
1989). The District Court originally held that due to N.P.C.'s status as a wholly-owned entity 
of the unrecognized Iranian government, it could not sue in a U.S. court and dismissed the 
action. National Petrochemical Co. of Iran, 930 F.2d at 242. On appeal, the Second Circuit, 
in response to an amicus curiae filed by the U.S., reversed the District Court decision and 
remanded the case. Id. 
387. National Petrochemical Co. of Iran, 930 F.2d at 243. 
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not absolve it of illegality.388 The Second Circuit had previously held 
that legitimate contracts may be rendered unenforceable by direct 
connection with illegal transactions.389 Thus, although N.P.C. dis-
puted the facial illegality of the shipping contract, the contract was 
unenforceable due to its inclusion as part of an overall scheme to vio-
late the embargo on Iran.390 N.P.C. claimed to have been unaware of 
the illegal origin of the cargo and argued that it was an issue of mate-
rial fact. 391 N.P.C. also argued that such lack of knowledge would 
allow the contract to be enforced. 392 The Second Circuit rejected 
N.P.C.'s claims and held that since N.P.C.'s agent, Monriss Enter-
prises, knew the transaction was illegal, such knowledge may be im-
puted to N.P.C. as Monriss Enterprise's principal.393 
VI. ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION CLAUSES 
A. David L. Threlkeld & Co. v. Metallgesellschaft, Ltd., 923 F.2d 
245 {2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 17 (1991); The Federal 
Arbitration Act preempts state law on enforcement of arbitral 
decisions in diversity actions involving international commerce. 
In David L. Threlkeld & Co. v. Metal/gesel/schaft, Ltd.,394 the 
Second Circuit held that the Federal Arbitration Act39s preempted a 
Vermont statute on enforcement of arbitral decisions in diversity ac-
tions dealing with interstate or international commerce. 396 Investor 
{Threlkeld) brought action against a British metal futures trader, 
Metallgesellschaft, Ltd. (M. G. ), alleging breach of an agreement to 
accurately value the investor's metal futures. 397 Threlkeld and M.G. 
had an informal standing agreement under which M.G., a dealer on 
the London Metal Exchange, would enter into metals futures con-
tracts on behalf of Threlkeld. 398 The arrangement was governed by a 
document titled "Terms of Business," which incorporated the rules 
and regulations of the London Metal Exchange by reference. 399 After 
388. Id. 
389. Id. (citing Bankers Trust Co. v. Litton Systems, 599 F.2d 488, 491 (2d Cir. 1979)). 
390. National Petrochemical Co. of Iran, 930 F.2d at 243. 
391. Id. 
392. Id. 
393. Id. at 244 (quoting Mallis v. Bankers Trust Co., 717 F.2d 683, 689 n.9 (2d Cir. 
1983)). 
394. 923 F.2d 245 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 17 (1991). 
395. Id. at 248 (citing 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 - 15). 
396. Id. at 250. 
397. Id. at 246. 
398. David L. Threlkeld & Co., 923 F.2d at 247. 
399. Id. 
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three years, Threlkeld and M. G. entered another agreement under 
which M.G. would accurately ascertain the value of Threlkeld's fu-
tures contracts.400 Upon being confronted with a $1.7 million margin 
call from M.G., Threlkeld sought an independent valuation of its fu-
tures contracts and discovered that M.G. had systematically over-
valued Threlkeld's position. 401 
Threlkeld initiated the action in the Federal District Court for 
Vermont for losses allegedly incurred as a result of M.G.'s systematic 
overvaluation.402 M.G. moved to stay proceedings and to compel ar-
bitration pursuant to the "Terms of Business" which incorporated the 
London Metal Exchange Rules which contain two arbitration provi-
sions. 403 The District Court treated it as a summary judgment motion 
and denied it. 404 
The Second Circuit held that the dispute was covered by the ar-
bitration clause implicit in the Terms of Business document.40s 
Although Vermont law406 voids any arbitration clause not explicitly 
agreed to by the parties, the Federal Arbitration Act preempts state 
law.407 Under Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co.,408 the 
Federal Arbitration Act applies in federal courts sitting in diversity 
suits relating to interstate or international commerce.409 Unlike the 
restrictive Vermont law, the Federal Arbitration Act requires only 
that the agreement to arbitrate be in writing.410 Since the London 
Metal Exchange rules on arbitration were incorporated in the "Terms 
of Business," they are enforceable under the Federal Arbitration 
Act.411 The Second Circuit, therefore, concluded that defendant M.G. 
was entitled to a stay of proceedings. 
400. Id. 
401. Id. 
402. David L. Threlkeld & Co., 923 F.2d at 248. 
403. Id. at 247 (quoting The London Metal Exchange Rules, Part 4, Rule 10.1 and Part 
8, Rule 1.1). 
404. Id. at 246. 
405. Id. at 249. 
406. David L. Threlkeld & Co., 923 F.2d at 249 (citing VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 5652(b) 
(1989)). 
407. Id. at 249 - 50. 
408. 388 U.S. 395 (1961)(cited in David L. Threlkeld & Co., 923 F.2d at 249). 
409. David L. Threlkeld & Co., 923 F.2d at 249 (citing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & 
Conklin Mfg., Co., 388 U.S. 395, 402 (1967)). 
410. Id. at 249 - 50. Vermont law requires that any agreement to arbitrate be displayed 
prominently in the contract and be signed by the parties. Id. at 249 (citing VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 
12 § 5652(b)). 
411. Id. at 250. 
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B. International Standard Blee. Corp. v. Bridas Sociedad 
Anonima Petrolera, Industrial Y Comercial, 7 45 F. Supp. 172 
(S.D.N.Y. 1990); Under the United Nations Convention on 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitra/ Awards, the court 
of the place of arbitration is the competent authority to set aside an 
arbitra/ award. 
The United States District Court for the Southern District of 
New York in International Standard Elec. Corp. v. Bridas Sociedad 
Anonima Petro/era, Industrial Y Comercial, 412 held that under the 
United Nations Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of For-
eign Arbitral Awards413 (New York Convention), only the courts of 
the situs of the arbitration are competent to review the arbitration and 
thus the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review an arbitral 
decision rendered in Mexico City.414 Petitioner International Stan-
dard Electric Corp. (I.S.E.C.) sought to vacate an arbitral award ren-
dered against it and in favor of respondent Bridas, a shareholder in 
I.S.E.C.'s wholly-owned Argentine subsidiary, Compania Standard 
Electric Argentina S.A. (C.S.E.A.), by an arbitral panel in Mexico 
City under the arbitration rules of the International Chamber of 
Commerce (I.C.C.).41 ~ Bridas sought dismissal of I.S.E.C.'s action 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and sought enforcement of the 
arbitral award.416 
Arbitration was held in Mexico pursuant to an arbitration clause 
in the shareholders agreement between I.S.E.C. and Bridas which re-
quired that all disputes be resolved through arbitration under the 
I.C.C. aegis.417 Bridas had alleged fraud by I.S.E.C. in connection 
with the sale of C.S.E.A. stock to Bridas, claiming I.S.E.C. misman-
aged C.S.E.A. and that I.S.E.C. had breached its fiduciary obligations 
to Bridas.418 The arbitral panel found for Bridas on the breach of 
fiduciary obligations claims, and awarded damages of $6, 793,000 with 
interest compounded annually at 12%, legal fees in the amount of 
$1,000,000 and costs in the amount of $400,000.419 
412. 745 F. Supp. 172 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
413. Id. at 173 (citing United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement 
of Foreign Arbitral Awards, signed New York City June 10, 1958, 3 U.S.T. 2517, T.l.A.S. No. 
6997, United States ratification 9 U.S.C. §§ 201 - 208) [hereinafter New York Convention]. 
414. Id. at 178. 
415. Id. at 173 - 75. 
416. International Standard Elec. Corp., 745 F. Supp. at 175. 
417. Id. at 174. 
418. Id. at 175. 
419. Id. 
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The court concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to 
vacate the arbitral decision under the New York Convention. 420 
Under article V(l)(e) of the New York Convention, an application for 
review of an arbitral award can be made only to the courts or compe-
tent authority of the country in which or under whose laws the award 
was made.421 Contrary to petitioner's argument that article V(l)(e) 
conferred jurisdiction on the courts of the country whose substantive 
law governs the dispute, the court held that it is the courts of the 
country whose procedural laws control that have jurisdiction to re-
view the arbitral decision.422 Although U.S. substantive law governed 
the arbitration, the suggestion that U.S. courts have jurisdiction defies 
the intent of the New York Convention to accommodate the proce-
durally diverse arbitral systems of the international community. 423 
The District Court noted that decisions of foreign courts deciding 
cases which have arisen under the New York Convention support the 
view that article V(l)(e) confers jurisdiction on the country whose 
procedural laws apply.424 The District Court concluded that article 
V(l)(e) confers jurisdiction to review the award on the courts of Mex-
ico. 42s The court thus dismissed the motion to vacate the award for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction and granted the petition to enforce 
the arbitral award. 426 
C. Corcoran v. Ardra Ins. Co., 567 N.E.2d 969, 77 N.Y.2d 225, 
566 N.Y.S.2d 575 (1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2260 (1991); The 
New York Convention, a treaty, ratified by the U.S., preempts 
conflicting federal and state law. 
In Corcoran v. Ardra Ins. Co.,427 the Court of Appeals of New 
York ruled that although the New York Convention preempts con-
flicting federal and state laws, New York Insurance Law article 74, 
authorizing the State Superintendent of Insurance to sue on behalf on 
420. International Standard Blee. Corp., 745 F. Supp. at 178. 
421. Id. at 176. 
422. Id. at 177. 
423. Id. 
424. International Standard Blee. Corp., 745 F. Supp. at 177 - 78. 
425. Id. at 178. 
426. Id. at 182. After dismissing petitioner's action to dismiss the vacatur action, the 
court granted respondent's cross-motion to enforce the Mexican arbitral decision. The court 
concluded that because petitioner had failed to prove any of the defenses to enforcement under 
the New York Convention, the court was compelled to enforce the award under article V of 
the New York Convention. Id. 
427. 567 N.B.2d 969, 77 N.Y.2d 225, 566 N.Y.S.2d 575 (1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 
2260 (1991). 
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insolvent insurance companies, is not preempted by the New York 
Convention. 428 
Plaintiff Superintendent of Insurance sued the defendant rein-
surer on behalf of the defunct Nassau Insurance Company.429 Nassau 
was owned by defendants Jeanne and Richard DiLoreto who also 
owned defendant Ardra Insurance Co., a Bermuda corporation. 430 
Nassau and Ardra had entered into three international reinsurance 
agreements, each of which contained an arbitration clause.431 Nassau 
subsequently became defunct and plaintiff initiated liquidation under 
New York Insurance Law article 74.432 Plaintiff sued on behalf of 
Nassau for recovery of reinsurance proceeds due under the reinsur-
ance contracts after Ardra repudiated the agreements. 433 Defendants 
moved to dismiss and to compel arbitration pursuant to the arbitra-
tion clauses included in the agreements, arguing that the arbitration 
clauses were entitled to enforcement under the New York 
Convention. 434 
The New York Court of Appeals agreed that the New York Con-
vention preempts conflicting state law, but held that the case came 
within one of the exceptions to enforcement of an arbitration 
clause. 43s Since the New York Convention was a treaty entered into 
by the U.S., it preempts conflicting state law pursuant to the 
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.436 The New York Con-
vention requires enforcement of an arbitral agreement when it covers 
subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration. 437 Courts in sig-
natory nations may refuse to submit disputes to arbitration if the arbi-
tration agreement is null, void, inoperative or incapable of being 
performed.438 Under the New York Insurance Law, however, the Su-
perintendent had not been granted the power to arbitrate claims and 
428. Corcoran, 567 N.E.2d at 970, 77 N.Y.2d at 228, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 576 (citing New 
York Convention, supra note 413). 
429. Id., 77 N.Y.2d at 229, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 576. 
430. Id., 77 N.Y.2d at 228, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 576. 
431. Id., 77 N.Y.2d at 228, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 576. 
432. Corcoran, 567 N.E.2d at 970, 77 N.Y.2d at 228 - 29, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 576. 
433. Id., 77 N.Y.2d at 229, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 576. 
434. Id., 77 N.Y.2d at 229, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 576. 
435. Id. at 972 - 73, 77 N.Y.2d at 231 - 34, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 578 - 79. 
436. Corcoran, 567 N.E.2d at 971, 77 N.Y.2d at 230, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 577 (citing U.S. 
CONST. art. VI, cl. 2). 
437. Id. at 972, 77 N.Y.2d at 231, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 578 (citing New York Convention, 
supra note 413, art. II). 
438. Id., 77 N.Y.2d at 231, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 578 (citing New York Convention, supra 
note 413, art. II). 
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must resort to state court litigation. 439 As a result, the Court of Ap-
peals concluded that claims by the Superintendent under New York 
Insurance Law article 74 are not arbitrable under the New York Con-
vention because "the arbitration clause and the dispute alleged to be 
subject to it are not capable of performance and settlement under the 
law of New York."440 
VII. CHOICE OF LAW 
A. Walpex Trading Co. v. Y acimientos Petroliferos Fiscales 
Bolivianos, 756 F. Supp. 136 (S.D.N.Y.), reargument denied, No. 
84 Civ. 4364 (PKL), 1991 WL 79464, 1991 US Dist LEXIS 6111 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991); Where the substantive issues of a claim do not 
arise under federal law, the F.S.LA. requires choice of law rules of 
the forum state to be applied. 
In Walpex Trading Co. v. Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales Bolivi-
anos,441 the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
New York held: 1) that Bolivian contract law. governed a dispute 
over a contract entered into by a Bolivian government procurement 
agency442 and 2) that defendant failed to prove that under Bolivian 
law the absence of a forum selection clause, conferring exclusive juris-
diction on the Bolivian courts, made the contract unenforceable. 443 
The court also refused to enforce an exclusive forum selection clause 
implied by Bolivian law.444 Walpex Trading Co. (Walpex) is an 
American export company which allegedly had entered into a con-
tract with defendant Y acimientos Petroliferos Fiscales Bolivianos 
(Y.F.P.B.), an agency of the Bolivian government, for the sale of pip-
ing to be used by the Bolivian oil industry.44s Defendant, Y.P.F.B., 
had placed an invitation for bids in various Bolivian newspapers. 446 
In addition to providing a general description of the piping sought, 
the invitation referred to specifications that would be provided by 
Y.F.P.B. upon request.447 These specifications included statements 
that the bidding would be governed by Y.F.P.B. regulations and that 
439. Id. at 972 - 73, 77 N.Y.2d at 232 - 233, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 578 - 79. 
440. Corcoran, 567 N.E.2d at 973, 77 N.Y.2d at 234, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 579. 
441. 756 F. Supp. 136 (S.D.N.Y.), reargument denied, No. 84 Civ. 4364 (PKL), 1991 WL 
79464, 1991 US Dist. 6111 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
442. Id. at 142. 
443. Id. at 143. 
444. Id. 
445. Walpex Trading Co, 756 F. Supp. at 137 - 38. 
446. Id. at 138. 
447. Id. 
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presentation of a bid implies submission to the laws and jurisdiction of 
Bolivia.448 The Y.F.P.B. regulations further provided that all con-
tracts with foreign organizations must contain an express clause sub-
jecting all issues emerging from the contract to the laws of Bolivia and 
the jurisdiction of its courts. 449 W alpex submitted a bid through its 
Bolivian sales agent, Compania de Representaciones Internacionales, 
S.R.L., and was eventually awarded the contract on April 7, 1982.450 
During the next 15 months, numerous extensions were requested by 
Y .F .P .B. regarding the deadline for full payment of the purchase price 
of the piping. On July 28, 1983, Y.F.P.B. formally repudiated the 
contract. 451 
Plaintiff W alpex initiated an action for breach of contract alleg-
ing that the acceptance of the bid formed an enforceable contract and 
additionally that it had entered supply contracts and had undertaken 
a performance bond as required by Y.F.P.B. in reliance on Y.F.P.B.'s 
acceptance of the bid. 452 Defendant moved for summary judgment 
and dismissal contending that no enforceable contract existed in the 
absence of a written agreement, and that even if an enforceable con-
tract existed, by implication it included the choice of law and choice 
of forum clauses stating that Bolivian law controls and Bolivian 
courts have exclusive jurisdiction. 453 In the alternative, defendant ar-
gued that even in the absence of an enforceable choice of forum 
clause, Bolivian law required dismissal of the action since it was a 
contract with a foreign party that did not contain the required choice 
of forum clause. 454 
The District Court denied defendant's motions for summary 
judgment and dismissal, but held that Bolivian law governed the dis-
pute. 455 When the substantive claim does not arise under federal law, 
the F.S.l.A. requires U.S. courts to apply the choice of law rules of 
the forum state.456 Under New York choice of law analysis, the law 
of the jurisdiction with the greatest interest in the litigation controls 
448. Id 
449. Walpex Trading Co., 756 F. Supp. at 138. 
450. Id. 
451. Id. 
452. Id The court had previously determined it had subject matter jurisdiction under the 
F.S.l.A. Id. (citing Walpex Trading Co. v. Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales Bolivianos, 712 
F. Supp. 383 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)). 
453. Walpex Trading Co., 756 F. Supp. at 139. 
454. Id. 
455. Id. at 139 - 42. 
456. Id. at 140. 
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the dispute. 457 The court concluded that since Bolivia has greater 
contacts with the action and Bolivia has the paramount interest in 
having its law control, the law of Bolivia controls. 458 All of the events 
underlying formation of the contract took place in Bolivia and virtu-
ally all of its performance was to take place in Bolivia. 459 The only 
contacts with the forum state of the litigation, New York, were the 
plaintiff's residency and the performance bond, which was issued by a 
New York bank. 460 
However, the court declined to find that the contract included an 
enforceable forum selection clause. 461 Although the Supreme Court 
had previously held that forum selection clauses should be given effect 
when freely negotiated and where there are no signs of fraud, duress, 
undue influence or overwhelming bargaining power,462 the District 
Court declined to pass on the validity of the forum selection clause 
alleged by defendants since it was not codified in a document. 463 In 
fact, the court noted that in the absence of any written document, the 
court could not pass on the validity of an exclusive forum clause that 
would have or should have been included in such a document. 464 The 
court thus denied defendant's motion on exclusive forum grounds. 465 
The court further denied the motions for summary judgment and 
dismissal on the grounds that Bolivian law would not give effect to the 
contract. 466 The court reasoned that although defendants presented 
an affidavit of a Bolivian law expert stating that Bolivian courts would 
not enforce a contract that did not include choice of forum and choice 
of law clauses, defendants did not provide evidence that the contract 
would be unenforceable under Bolivian law where there were allega-
tions of bad faith which induced the plaintiff to rely on the acceptance 
of the bid. 467 
457. Walpex Trading Co., 756 F. Supp. at 140 (citing Schultz v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 
480 N.E.2d 679, 684, 65 N.Y.2d 189, 197, 491 N.Y.S.2d 90, 95 (1985)). 
458. Id. at 142. 
459. Id. at 140. 
460. Id. 
461. Walpex Trading Co., 756 F. Supp. at 143. 
462. Id. at 142 (quoting The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972)). 
463. Id. 
464. Id. 
465. Walpex Trading Co., 756 F. Supp. at 142. 
466. Id. at 143. 
467. Id. 
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VIII. ASYLUM 
A. Melendez v. United States Dep't of Justice, 926 F.2d 211 (2d 
Cir. 1991); An INS factual determination of whether to grant 
asylum based on a claim of a "well founded fear" of persecution or 
to withhold deportation based on a showing of a "clear probability" 
of persecution is reviewable under the substantial evidence standard. 
The facts in Melendez v. United States Dep't of Justice,468 con-
cerned the controversial area of asylum for El Salvadoran aliens 
claiming persecution due to threats from death squads and the mili-
tary. The Second Circuit considered the standard the U.S. Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service's (INS) Board of Immigration 
Appeals (Board of Appeals) applies to an applicant's request for a 
grant of asylum.469 Additionally, the Second Circuit elaborated on 
the standard of review for Board of Appeals determinations on with-
holding of deportation. 410 
Petitioner, the asylum applicant, was a forty year old native of El 
Salvador who has resided in the U.S. since 1984.471 While in El Salva-
dor, petitioner had been active in the La Uno party working for free 
elections in El Salvador and for the election of Salvadoran President 
Duarte.472 From 1974 to 1982, petitioner alleges he was threatened 
repeatedly by government security forces, compelling him to leave his 
family and constantly move around El Salvador.473 Many of his col-
leagues from La Uno were jailed, murdered or had disappeared.474 
Petitioner's brother and wife had both been murdered. 475 Members of 
church organizations familiar with the El Salvadoran death squads 
testified before an INS judge about these activities. 476 Petitioner came 
to the U.S. illegally in 1982 and was deported to El Salvador.477 After 
more threats to his personal safety, petitioner returned to the U.S. in 
1984.478 
Both the INS judge and the Board of Appeals denied the petition 
for asylum and the request to withhold deportation.479 The Board of 
468. 926 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1991). 
469. Id. at 214 - 16. 
470. Id. at 218. 
471. Id. at 213. 
472. Melendez, 926 F.2d at 213. 
473. Id. 
474. Id. 
475. Id. 
476. Melendez, 926 F.2d at 213. 
477. Id. 
478. Id. 
479. Id. at 213 - 214. 
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Appeals decided that under § 208(a) and § 243(h) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act480 (I.N.A.) petitioner had failed to demonstrate a 
"well founded fear" of persecution as required for a grant of asy-
lum481 or a "clear probability" of persecution required for withhold-
ing deportation.482 In particular, the Board of Appeals found that 
petitioner had failed to demonstrate a connection between his brother 
and wife's deaths, on the one hand, and claimed threats of persecution 
against petitioner on the other.483 The Board of Appeals also found 
that petitioner had failed to demonstrate that he was threatened or the 
nature of the alleged threats. 484 The Second Circuit reversed and 
granted the petition.48s 
Granting asylum under § 208(a) of the I.N.A. is two-step pro-
cess. 486 First, the petitioner must demonstrate a "well founded fear" 
of persecution in his/her native land. 487 Second, the petitioner must 
seek asylum which may be granted at the discretion of the Attorney 
General. 488 The Supreme Court has held that the "well founded fear" 
standard might be satisfied upon a showing that persecution was a 
"reasonable possibility."489 Similarly, the Second Circuit has previ-
ously held that the standard is satisfied upon demonstration that a 
reasonable person would fear persecution if returned to his or her na-
tive country. 490 This standard involves both subjective proof that the 
petitioner fears persecution and an objective showing that the fear is 
reasonable.491 Proof of the objective component may include docu-
mentary evidence of future persecution492 or credible oral testimony 
480. Immigration and Naturalization Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1103 - 1525, § 1158(a), 
§ 1253(h)(l) (1991) (cited in Melendez, 926 F.2d at 213 - 14). 
481. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 208(a) (cited in Melendez, 926 F.2d at 
213 - 14). 
482. Id. at § 243(h) (cited in Melendez, 926 F.2d at 218). 
483. Melendez, 926 F.2d at 214. 
484. Id. 
485. Id. at 219 - 20. 
486. Section 208(a) confers discretion on the Attorney General to grant asylum to refu-
gees. A refugee is: 
any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality ... who is unable or 
unwilling to return to ... that country because of persecution or a well founded fear of 
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 
group, or political opinion. 
8 U.S.C. § l 101(a)(42)(A) (cited in Melendez, 926 F.2d at 214). 
487. Melendez, 926 F.2d at 214 (citing Immigration and Nationality Act§ 208(a)). 
488. Id. at 215 (citing Carcamo - Flores v. INS, 805 F.2d 60, 65 (2d Cir. 1986)). 
489. Id. (citing INS v. Stevie, 467 U.S. 407, 424 - 25 (1984)). 
490. Id. (citing Carcamo - Flores, 805 F.2d at 68). 
491. Melendez, 926 F.2d at 215. 
492. Id. (citing Del Valle v. INS, 776 F.2d 1407, 1411 (9th Cir. 1985)). 
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that petitioner has good reason to fear being singled-out for persecu-
tion. 493 The court concluded that the Board of Appeals correctly ap-
plied the reasonable person standard in determining whether there 
was a "well founded fear" of persecution for which asylum may be 
granted. 494 
In the alternative to the§ 208(a) claims, petitioner also raised an 
I.N.A. § 243(h)49s claim that withholding of deportation was 
mandatory.496 The standard of proof under§ 243(h) is materially dif-
ferent than that under§ 208(a).497 Section 243(h) requires a demon-
stration that there is a "clear probability," or it is "more likely than 
not," that the alien would be subject to persecution. 498 The Board of 
Appeals in this case was therefore correct in applying the "more likely 
than not" standard to petitioner's claim under § 243(h) to withhold 
deportation. 499 
In addition to addressing whether the Board of Appeals applied 
the correct standards, the court also discussed the standard of review 
to which a Board of Appeals determination would be held. The Sec-
ond Circuit's analysis of the standard of review applied to a Board of 
Appeals determination under § 208(a) differentiated between a fact 
finding components00 and a discretionary component. sm The purely 
factual determination of whether there is a "well founded fear" of 
persecution is reviewable under the substantial evidence standard ar-
ticulated under§ 106(a)(4) of the I.N.A.s02 The discretionary compo-
nent is only reviewable for abuse of discretion.so3 Under § 243(h), 
however, the Board of Appeals only makes a factual determination of 
493. Id at 215 (citing Del Valle, 776 F.2d at 1411 (quoting Cardozo - Fonseca v. INS, 
767 F.2d 1448, 1453 (9th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 480 U.S. 421 (1987))). 
494. Id 
495. Melendez, 926 F.2d at 215. Section 243(h) provides that: 
The Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien . . . to a country if the 
Attorney General determines that such alien's life or freedom would be threatened in 
such country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 
group, or political opinion. 
8 U.S.C. § 1253(hXl) (cited in Melendez, 926 F.2d at 214). 
496. Id at 215. 
497. Id. 
498. Id (citing INS v. Stevie, 467 U.S. 407, 424 - 25 (1984)). 
499. Melendez, 926 F.2d at 215. 
500. Id The fact component relates to the Board of Appeal's determination of whether 
the applicant is a refugee for asylum purposes. 
501. Id at 216. The discretionary component is associated with the ultimate grant or 
denial of asylum. 
502. Id. at 216 (citing 8 U.S.C. § l 105a(aX4)). 
503. Melendez, 926 F.2d at 218. 
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whether there is a clear probability of persecution. s04 Its determina-
tion is therefore to be reviewed under the substantial evidence stan-
dard. sos The court concluded that petitioner had sufficiently 
demonstrated probability of persecution to trigger the withholding of 
deportation under § 243(h). s06 The court specifically rejected the rea-
soning employed by the Board of Appeals that because threats by El 
Salvadoran death squads are common among members of political or-
ganizations in that country, petitioner's claim did not demonstrate a 
unique level of fear and did not warrant asylum or a stay of deporta-
tion. so7 Instead of undercutting a claim for asylum, objective evi-
dence of violent conditions in a country is especially probative of a 
"well founded fear" of persecution. sos Thus, the court remanded the 
case to INS for a new hearing to reevaluate whether petitioner could 
satisfy the "clear probability" of persecution standard for withholding 
deportation. s09 
IX. EXTRADITION 
A. Spatola v. United States, 925 F.2d 615 (2d Cir. 1991); When a 
foreign court has convicted a person to be extradited from the U.S., 
there is no need for independant determination of probable cause by 
a U.S. court. Extradition orders need only consider whether the 
magistrate had jurisdiction, whether the offenses charged are within 
the Treaty on Extradition and whether there was any evidence 
supporting the finding that there was reason to believe that the person 
to be extradited was guilty of the crimes charged. 
In Spatola v. United States,sto the Second Circuit affirmed the 
District Court's ruling on an extradition request from Italy.m The 
party to be extradited, the relator, had been convicted in Italian 
courts for drug trafficking and related currency offenses in 1983.s12 
Spatola, the relator in this action, had been imprisoned, but was re-
leased while his appeal in the Italian courts was pending.s13 While his 
appeal was pending on the earlier charges, Spatola was convicted by 
504. Id. 
505. Id. 
506. Id. at 219. 
507. Melendez, 926 F.2d at 219. The Attorney General has discretion with respect to 
whether grant asylum, but does not have discretion regarding the withholding of deportation. 
508. Id. at 211. 
509. Id. at 220. 
510. 925 F.2d 615 (1991). 
511. Id. at 618. 
512. Id. at 617. 
513. Id. 
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an Italian court of bribing a public official.514 He then fled to the 
U.S.515 Upon learning of his presence in the U.S., the Italian Govern-
ment made a formal request for his extradition.516 After a hearing, 
the U.S. Magistrate found that Spatola was extraditable under the 
Treaty on Extradition Between the Government of the United States 
and the Government of the Republic of ltaly517 (Treaty on Extradi-
tion). The Magistrate concluded that there was probable cause to be-
lieve Spatola committed the offenses in Italy for which he was 
charged, and that since the offenses were criminal in the U.S. as well, 
the dual criminality requirement of the Treaty on Extradition was sat-
isfied. 518 Spatola subsequently brought an action for a writ of habeas 
corpus challenging the Magistrate's order to extradite. The District 
Court denied Spatola's request for habeas corpus relief. 519 
The Second Circuit affirmed the District Court's denial of habeas 
corpus relief. 52° First, the court noted that although orders certifying 
request for extradition are not final decisions of the court and hence 
non-appealable, a relator may obtain limited review of extradition or-
ders by seeking a writ of habeas corpus.521 The scope of review is 
confined to whether the magistrate had jurisdiction, whether the of-
fenses charged are within the Treaty on Extradition and whether 
there was any evidence supporting the finding that there was reason to 
believe that the relator is guilty of the crimes charged. 522 
Spatola contended that the Magistrate erred in finding probable 
cause to believe he committed the offenses in Italy based on an analy-
sis of the Italian appellate court order affirming his earlier convictions 
of drug trafficking. 523 The Second Circuit affirmed the District 
Court's holding that there need be no independent basis for finding 
probable cause. 524 To rule that a conviction, after a trial at which the 
relator was present and represented by counsel, does not constitute 
probable cause would require magistrates to substitute their judgment 
514. Spatola, 925 F.2d at 617. 
515. Id. 
516. Id. 
517. Treaty on Extradition Between the Government of the United States of America and 
the Government of the Republic ofltaly, Oct. 13, 1983, T.l.A.S. No. 10837 [hereinafter Treaty 
on Extradition] (cited in Spatola, 925 F.2d at 617). 
518. Spatola, 925 F.2d at 618 (citing Treaty on Extradition, supra note 517, art. II). 
519. Id. at 617. 
520. Id. at 619. 
521. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2241). 
522. Spatola, 925 F.2d at 619 (citing Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311 (1925)). 
523. Id. at 618. 
524. Id. 
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for that of the foreign court. 525 The interests of international comity 
require recognition of the foreign conviction as probable cause. 526 
Moreover, the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court's finding 
that the drug smuggling and money laundering offenses for which 
Spatola was convicted satisfy the dual criminality requirement of the 
Treaty on Extradition. 527 Extradition was thus permissible under the 
Treaty on Extradition because the relator's offenses were criminal 
under the penal laws of both contracting parties, the U.S. and Italy.528 
X. MISCELLANEOUS 
A. International Judicial Assistance 
1. In re Request For Int'l Judicial Assistance (Letter Rogatory) 
For the Federative Republic of Brazil (General Universal Trading 
Corp. v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co.), 936 F.2d 702 (2d Cir. 1991); 
Evidence may be produced pursuant to a foreign government's letter 
rogatory in the absence of a pending adjudicative proceeding in the 
foreign state only if such a proceeding is very likely to occur within a 
brief interval from the time the request is made. 
The Second Circuit's only foray into international judicial assist-
ance during the survey year was in In re Request For International 
Judicial Assistance (Letter Rogatory) For the Federative Republic of 
Brazil. 529 The case involved motions by Panamanian corporations to 
quash a subpoena duces tecum directed to the New York office of 
Morgan Guaranty Trust Company (Morgan) at the request of a Bra-
zilian prosecutor to compel discovery of records pertaining to the cor-
porations' accounts. s3o The subpoena arose out of a Brazilian 
investigation into the contents of the Panamanian accounts at Morgan 
and whether they were the proceeds of illegal activity in Brazil. 531 
Congress has authorized the U.S. courts to aid foreign courts in pro-
duction of evidence necessary to adjudicative proceedings.532 Not 
clear, however, was whether that authorization includes situations 
where actual adjudicative proceedings have not yet been com-
525. Id. 
526. Spatola, 925 F.2d at 618. 
527. Id. at 619 (citing Treaty on Extradition, supra note 518, art. II). These offenses fall 
within the proscriptions under U.S. law against conspiring to traffic narcotics, 21 U.S.C. 
§§ 841(a)(l), 846, 953, 963, and against conspiring to launder money, 18 U.S.C. § 1956. 
528. Id. 
529. 936 F.2d 702 (2d Cir. 1991). 
530. Id. at 703. 
531. Id. 
532. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1782). 
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menced. 533 The District Court concluded that assistance could be 
rendered so long as proceedings in the foreign tribunal were 
"possible. " 534 
The Second Circuit reversed. The federal letters rogatory statute 
provides that, "[ t ]he district court of the district in which a person 
resides or is found may order him to give his testimony or statement 
or to produce a document or other thing for use in a proceeding in a 
foreign or international tribunal . . . . " 535 Prior to amendment in 
1964, the statute required that the requested evidence be used in a 
"pending" judicial proceeding. 536 The Second Circuit had previously 
interpreted the amended version of the statute as not limited to pro-
ceedings in conventional courts or tribunals. 537 The authority could 
be exercised when the requesting sovereign is exercising an adjudica-
tive function. 538 The deletion of the word "pending" from the statute 
in 1964 indicates that its application does not require the foreign adju-
dication to be pending.539 The Second Circuit, however, concluded 
that the adjudicative proceeding nonetheless must be imminent, i.e. 
"very likely to occur and very soon to occur."540 It is not sufficient 
that adjudicative proceedings are "probable" as the District Court 
had ruled. Because the Brazilian proceedings in this case were still 
investigatory with prosecution only "possible," the evidence in the 
record did not satisfy the standards of the statute authorizing judicial 
assistance. 541 
533. In re Request for Int'l Judicial Assitance, 936 F.2d at 705. 
534. Id. at 704 (citing Jn re Request for Int'l Judicial Assistance, 687 F. Supp. 880 
(S.D.N.Y. 1988)). 
535. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1782). 
536. Id. (quoting Pub. L. No. 773, 62 Stat. 869, 949 (1948) as amended by Pub. L. No. 
73, 63 Stat. 89, 103 (1949)). 
537. In re Request for Int'l Judicial Assitance, 936 F.2d at 705 (citing Jn re Letters Roga-
tory Issued by the Director oflnspection of the Government oflndia, 385 F.2d 1017, 1019 - 20 
(2d Cir. 1967)). 
538. Id. 
539. Id. at 706. 
540. Id. 
541. In re Request for Int'l Judicial Assistance, 936 F.2d at 707. 
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